University of North Carolina School of Law

Carolina Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2017

Claiming the Copyright
Amanda Reid
areid@unc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Publication: Yale Law & Policy Review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

Reid FINAL COPY.docx (Do Not Delete)

7/7/2016 3:29 PM

YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
Claiming the Copyright
Amanda Reid*
Introduction ..................................................................................................... 425
I.

Why Claim ...................................................................................................429

II. History of Claiming ................................................................................. 434
III. Claiming Today ..........................................................................................444
IV. A Modest Proposal: Claim the Copyright .......................................... 451
Conclusion .........................................................................................................469
Introduction
Our modern world is filled with a dizzying number of copyrights. 1 The
texts, tweets, and selfies created each day are automatically copyrighted, as are
home movies, diary entries, and Play-doh® sculptures. All original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression are protected for seventy
*

Associate Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. Ph.D., University of
Florida, College of Journalism and Communications, 2004; J.D., University of
Florida, Levin College of Law, 2004; M.A., Florida State University, Speech
Communication, 1999; B.A., Florida State University, Communication and
Philosophy, 1998. Participants at the 2015 Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property
Colloquium (WIPIP) provided valuable insights for which I am grateful. And
special thanks to Victoria Pasculli, Elizabeth Willis, and the other thoughtful
editors of the Yale Law & Policy Review.

1.

See Dotan Oliar et al., Copyright Registrations: Who, What, When, Where, and Why,
92 TEX. L. REV. 2211, 2240 (2014) (“Every day, millions of emails, tweets, and
messages are sent; blog posts and online articles are posted; still photos and videos
are taken with cameras and cellphones; the vast majority of all of these are likely
copyright protected. Yet, the vast majority of these are not registered, be it because
many are not created for profit, or because the cost and trouble of registration
outweighs the creator’s expected benefit.”).
425
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years after the author’s death. 2 This protection attaches automatically whether
or not the author knows it or wants it. 3 And this protection not only includes
verbatim copying but also adaptations. The dimensions of copyright protection
have incrementally expanded since our first Copyright Act in 1790. One wonders if today we have too many copyrighted works and too much copyright protection.
Copyright offers a limited exclusive right in response to the market failure
of public goods. Without a way to protect the investment in nonexcludable,
nonrivalrous products, authors and inventors might not create. 4 The classic incentive theory posits that limited term, exclusive rights—and the corresponding
supracompetitive prices—are tolerated, as a way to encourage the creation of
new works. 5 Authors are therefore granted exclusive rights as a way to promote
socially beneficial goods. 6 But if these exclusive rights are not calibrated correctly, they can impose more costs than public benefits. 7 In other words, copyright
can end up suppressing more communicative activity than it encourages. 8
2.

17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). For works made for hire and for anonymous or
pseudonymous works, the duration of copyright is ninety-five years from first
publication or 120 years from creation, whichever is shorter. Id. § 302(c).

3.

Id. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”).

4.

See Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods: Trading Gold for
Dross, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 164 (2002) (“A ‘public good’ is a good that can be
shared non-rivalrously by many, and from whose use non-payors are not easily
physically excluded. Goods with these characteristics are susceptible to free riding,
and thus difficult to produce in a normal competitive market. Inventions and
works of authorship are ‘public goods’ whose creation is stimulated by the limited
private exclusion rights known as patent and copyright. Lighthouses and public
defense are ‘public goods’ for which governments usually provide direct
support.”).

5.

See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 131 (2004).

6.

See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985)
(“The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the
store of knowledge a fair return for their labors.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“The monopoly privileges that
Congress may authorize are . . . a means by which an important public purpose
may be achieved.”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare.”).

7.

See Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in
Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 858 (1992).

8.

See Gordon, supra note 4, at 167.
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Copyright has historically been a limited right. 9 Yet today these limits have
expanded to an unprecedented scope. The concern with rights accretion is that
as more creative works are within the private domain, fewer are in the public
domain from which others can draw for new creative expressions. 10 New works
build upon prior works, yet there are fewer building blocks for new creations.
One way to check and re-balance the interests of copyright holders and users is with formalities. For nearly two centuries, U.S. copyright law relied on
statutory formalities to balance the public interest with the interests of copyright holders. 11 These formalities historically included affixing a copyright notice on the work and filing a registration with the government. Today no formalities are necessary for an original work of authorship to secure protection
for seventy years after the author’s death. Copyright attaches automatically.
This watershed change was spurred by a desire to harmonize U.S. copyright law
with the laws of other developed nations. 12 Our obligations under international
treaties require that copyright attach automatically and without constitutive
formalities. 13 But accepting the proposition that copyright now attaches at the
moment of fixation in a tangible medium of expression does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that a copyright holder should be relieved of all responsibility to publicly claim her work. 14 Copyright protection gives an author an ex-

9.

As detailed in Part II, historically copyright has been limited in duration and
scope. The U.S. Constitution prescribes that copyright protection be for “limited
Times.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. And the first copyright, in 1790, was for a
renewable, fourteen-year term and applied only to maps, books, and charts. Act of
May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).

10.

See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 13-16 (2004).

11.

See Daniel Gervais & Dashiell Renaud, The Future of United States Copyright
Formalities: Why We Should Prioritize Recordation, and How To Do It, 28 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1459, 1460-62 (2013); see also Catherine Seville, Copyright’s Bargain:
Defining Our Terms, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 312, 312 (2003) (noting that legislatures
around the world have “struggled to reconcile the needs of all those whom
copyright law is intended to serve”).

12.

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 264-65 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
1976 Act thoroughly revised copyright law and enabled the United States to join
the Berne Convention . . . .”).

13.

See Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works, Sept. 9,
1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No.
99-27 (1886) [hereinafter Berne Convention].

14.

Cf. Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1470 (“The United States’ adherence to
Berne marks an apparent acceptance of the principle that copyright should vest
upon creation, whence a rule prohibiting mandatory formalities seems eminently
logical.”).
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clusive right in the work, 15 in essence a monopoly right, in exchange for promoting the progress of science and learning. 16 This instrumental view of copyright sees the limited monopoly right as a means to encourage original works of
authorship. 17 As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “the Framers intended
copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.” 18
Public claiming has been part of the bargained-for exchange with the pub19
lic. The balance of copyright’s quid pro quo is fundamentally upset when a
copyright holder is relieved of all obligations to claim an interest in her work.
The monopoly is now given indiscriminately to all original works. Exclusive
rights are now given to holders that may neither know nor want the protection.
Rather than creating simple and easy formalities, we abandoned formalities altogether. We should certainly not return to the cumbersome registration and
protectionist manufacturing clause formalities of the past. 20 But that does not
mean we cannot construct a reasonable system that balances the interests of authors and content users.
Historically, a copyright holder had to claim. And today there is no doctrinal reason to exempt copyright from claiming. I offer a modest proposal that
seeks to balance these interests: a copyright holder should have to claim an interest in her work, and if she doesn’t, users of the work should be able to rely on
an innocent infringer defense when facing a claim for infringement.
To explore more fully the proposition that a copyright holder should have
to claim an interest in her work, this Article progresses in four parts. Part I ex-

15.

The modern copyright holder has six statutory rights, including the exclusive right
to make copies, prepare derivatives, publicly distribute, publicly perform, and
publicly display the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(6) (2012).

16.

See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003)
(“The rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a ‘carefully crafted
bargain,’ under which, once the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the
public may use the invention or work at will and without attribution.”) (internal
citation omitted).

17.

See Thomas F. Cotter, Memes and Copyright, 80 TUL. L. REV. 331, 332 (2005) (“On
this [instrumental] view, copyright promotes the progress of ‘science’ by
encouraging authors (and publishers) to create (and publish) works of authorship,
at a greater rate or lower social cost than would be the case in the absence of a
copyright system.”).

18.

Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); see also
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (“[T]he Framers intended copyright
itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the
use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas.”).

19.

Cf. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Copyright As Contract, 22 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 279, 281 (2015)
(“Copyright is essentially a contract between the author and the public with the
government acting as the agent of the public.”).

20.

See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
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plores the foundations and reasons for public claiming of the intangible copyright. Part II traces the history of formalities in the United States. Part III outlines the problems that have arisen because we no longer require claiming. And
Part IV contextualizes and discusses my proposal to incentivize copyright holders to claim their works and to reinvigorate the innocent infringer defense.
I.

Why Claim

Claiming serves important functions to signal ownership interests, filter out
undeserving and commercially dead works, and facilitate licensing of commercially valuable works. Notice and registration signal an ownership claim to the
world. 21 Ownership means that certain protections apply and that an owner exists to enforce those protections. 22 Ownership of property interests comes with
the right to exclude. 23 An exclusive right empowers an interest holder to prevent
others from copying and using a work.
Public claiming of an ownership interest is particularly important for intangible resources. 24 Protection of copyright, like other forms of “property,” is
not absolute and should be tailored to balance the benefits and burdens of protection. 25 Copyright should be cabined by its purpose, and copyright should
balance public and private interests. 26 Without someone claiming the intangible
copyright, it can be exceedingly difficult to identify its owner. Without an identifiable owner to benefit from the monopoly, copyright protection is a net social
loss. 27
The long-term purpose of copyright is to create a public benefit. This purpose is achieved by according short-term monopoly benefits to the copyright
holder. 28 But without an owner to claim short-term monopoly benefits, the ex-

21.

Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1460-61.

22.

See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property is
Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715 (1993); Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual
Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108 (1990).

23.

See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730
(1998).

24.

See Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2013).

25.

See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV.
503, 510 (1945).

26.

See id. at 506.

27.

See Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the Interest of Copyright Owners
and Users: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 19-20 (2008) (statement of
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).

28.

See Paul J. Heald, Reviving the Rhetoric of the Public Interest: Choir Directors, Copy
Machines, and New Arrangements of Public Domain Music, 46 DUKE L.J. 241, 247
429
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clusive rights of the monopoly create a burden on users without a corresponding benefit to an owner. Excluding the public from works that do not have an
identifiable owner is inefficient, wasteful, and creates deadweight losses. 29 Inadequate claiming thus raises the social costs of offering copyright protection. 30
Public claiming would ameliorate the difficulty in identifying a copyright
holder. Claiming signals the identity of the owner to the world and that enforceable restrictions apply. As Professor James Gibson has noted, “the familiar
c-in-a-circle, followed by the year of publication and the name of the copyright
owner, served to inform the public that it was dealing with something laden
with legal restrictions, that there were certain things it could and could not do
with the work.” 31 The Constitution prescribes that copyright protection is only
for “limited Times,” and claiming historically signaled whether the temporary
protection had yet expired. 32 Public claiming helps distinguish between works
for which you need permission and works that you are freely able to use.
Formalities historically have balanced public and private interests, but today, copyright is radically unbalanced in favor of private interests. 33 To exercise
the statutory monopoly, a copyright holder historically had to claim her work. 34
The original purpose of formalities, as copyright scholar William Patry has noted, was two-fold: “(1) require those interested in obtaining copyright protection
to take affirmative steps and (2) create a public record so that those wishing to
use the work might be put on notice of the author or proprietor’s claim.” 35 At
the inception of federal copyright protection in the late 1800s, only a small frac-

(1996) (“[The Framers of the Constitution] knew that the grant of exclusive rights
would be a cost borne directly by the public, and they demanded a direct public
benefit in return.”).
29.

See Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197,
1209 (1996) (“Copyright creates the deadweight social loss associated with
monopoly power over distribution of already-created works, it increases the cost
of creating new works by making it costly to avoid infringing existing copyrights,
and it requires an enforcement mechanism.”).

30.

See Menell & Meurer, supra note 24, at 10-11 (identifying four types of costs on
other resource developers cause by inadequate resource notice).

31.

James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 207 (2005).

32.

See infra notes 59-98 and accompanying text.

33.

See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487,
490 (2004).

34.

See Bernard R. Sorkin, The Futility of a Future Without Formalities, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 589, 591 (1995) (“The historic conception of copyright in this
country, as a legal monopoly, seems to require that some assertion be made by
those who wish to benefit from the monopoly.”).

35.

3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 6:19 (2015).
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tion of published works were registered, which meant the majority of works entered the public domain, and these works were available for all to use. 36
Copyright is intended to balance users’ interests in access to works with authors’ interests in compensation for use of their works. 37 Copyright should balance supply-side incentives against demand-side realities. In other words, the ex
ante incentives for creating works should be balanced against the public’s need
to use works. 38 Historically, formalities helped maintain this balance. Today, a
simple notice provision coupled with an efficient registration procedure would
be a reasonable way to balance the public’s interest with the author’s interest.
In addition to signaling an ownership interest, public claiming would help
ensure that we are protecting the right types of works; otherwise, there is a
chilling effect on free expression and deadweight losses on social creativity. 39
Formalities signal that a work is being claimed as valuable and help filter out
those works that are not commercially valuable. 40 If an author is so unmoved by
copyright that she is not willing to put minimal notice information on a work,
why should the public be required to shoulder the cost of the monopoly? 41
There are costs for locking up materials with copyright protection. But there are
also costs associated with requiring an author to publicly claim her work. Public
claiming is either a cost on the author to comply with the formality, or it is a
deadweight cost on society when notice is missing. In light of the broad protection offered by copyright today, notice failure externalities should be borne by

36.

1 id. § 1:19 (“Records assembled by the Library of Congress indicate that more than
15,000 works were published in the United States between 1790 and 1800, but that
only 779 copyright registrations were made in this same period.”). See also
Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1063 (2001)
(explaining that “tiny regulation of a tiny proportion of the extraordinary range of
creative work in 1790 has morphed into this massive regulation of everyone who
has any connection to the most trivial of creative authorship”).

37.

Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1176 (2010).

38.

See Robert Spoo, Ezra Pound’s Copyright Statute: Perpetual Rights and the Problem
of Heirs, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1775, 1795 (2009); see also Lemley, supra note 5.

39.

See Sprigman, supra note 33, at 489-90.

40.

Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: Too Many Copyrights?, 54 COMM. ACM 29, 31
(2011) (“If too many works are in-copyright for too long, then our culture suffers
and we also lose the ability to distinguish in a meaningful way between those
works that need copyright protection and those that don’t.”).

41.

Dotan Oliar & Nicholas Matich, Copyright Preregistration: Evidence and Lessons
from the First Seven Years, 2005-2012, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1073, 1121 (2013) (“An author’s
failure to comply with a formality—which in the case of notice is as innocuous as
adding the copyright symbol, ©, together with the author’s name and the date to
the work—suggests that no copyright incentive was needed to induce its creation.
If so, it makes no sense for society to bear the limitations that copyright protection
puts on the work’s copying and distribution.”).
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the copyright holder, rather than by the public. The copyright holder receives
more copyright protection today. In exchange, a copyright holder should have
to claim her work at a minimum.
Notice and registration can facilitate finding the copyright holder, from
whom permission can be negotiated. But notice failure increases the transaction
costs to license a work. 42 Efficient licensing of protected works depends on being able to identify and locate the appropriate rights holder. Claiming would
help reduce the high transaction costs of license-seekers identifying and contacting rights holders. Public claiming would also give clarity and comfort to
potential users of the works. The difficulty in identifying a copyright holder has
created “orphan works,” which are works essentially held hostage by copyright
protections. 43
In a nutshell, the orphan works problem is this: today nearly all works are
protected by copyright. To use a protected work, a user typically needs permission, to “either ensure peace of mind, avoid unpredictability, or, more likely, to
avoid exposure to liability,” as the Copyright Office noted. 44 A user cannot get
permission if she cannot find the copyright holder. 45 And without permission,
users do not risk using the works. 46 This decision to forgo using the work is not
in the public interest. For example, libraries and museums have substantial por-

42.

David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 156 (2009)
(“[I]n a culture where the stakes of infringement are enormous, potential users
must spend enormous amounts of time and money trying to track down the
owners of such works and make sure they have cleared the rights to them.”).

43.

See Lydia Pallas Loren, Abandoning the Orphans: An Open Access Approach to
Hostage Works, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1431, 1434 (2012) (“I conclude that these
works should not be viewed as ‘orphans,’ but rather as ‘hostages’—constrained in
their movement by the restricting combination of copyright law and the absence
of copyright owners who could release works from their confinement.”).

44.

REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS
DIGITIZATION 41 (2015) [hereinafter ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION],
http://copyright.gov/orphan/reports/orphan-works2015.pdf. The Copyright Office
has emphasized that the “the orphan works problem is widespread and
significant” because “anyone using an orphan work does so under a legal cloud, as
there is always the possibility that the copyright owner could emerge after the use
has commenced and seek substantial infringement damages, an injunction, and/or
attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 2.

45.

Id. at 35.

46.

REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 15
(2006) [hereinafter 2006 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS], http://www.copyright.gov/
orphan/orphan-report.pdf (“Many users of copyrighted works who have limited
resources or are particularly risk-averse have indicated that the risk of liability for
copyright infringement, however remote, is enough to prompt them simply to not
make use of the work.”).
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tions of their collections that do not have an identifiable owner. 47 The preservation and dissemination of these materials is often thwarted by copyright. This
decision to forgo using copyrighted works in ways that would contribute to education, culture, and research creates deadweight loss.
The public has legitimate interests in using others’ works. Libraries, museums, archives, and universities often have large collections of donated materials
for which authorship is unknown. 48 These collections include photographs, unpublished manuscripts and letters, and works of fine art and visual art. Scholars,
documentary filmmakers, publishers, and private citizens have legitimate interests in accessing these works. 49 Yet the Register of Copyrights observed: “when
confronted by the absence of clear information about the work’s owner, most
users simply do not use the work.” 50 The risks are too high. As the Register of
Copyrights noted, “[c]urrently, anyone using an orphan work runs the risk that
the copyright owner may step forward and bring an infringement action for
substantial damages, attorneys’ fees, and/or injunctive relief unless a specific exception or limitation to copyright applies.” 51 Today museums and libraries have
millions of pages of archival documents, photographs, oral histories, and reels
of film that they cannot publish or digitize because the authorship is uncertain. 52
These works are essentially held captive by the automatic copyright afforded to these works. Without permission from unknown copyright holders, these

47.

See, e.g., Response by the J. Paul Getty Trust et al. to the Notice of Inquiry
Concerning Orphan Works and Mass Digitization (Feb. 4, 2013),
http://copyright.gov/orphan/comments/noi_10222012/Museums.pdf; Response by
the Cornell University Library to the Notice of Inquiry Concerning Orphan
Works, Comment OW0569, at 1-2 (Mar. 23, 2005), http://copyright.gov/orphan/
comments/OW0569-Thomas.pdf. This problem is not unique to the United States.
See NAT’L MUSEUM DIRS. COUNCIL, ORPHAN WORKS AND VOLUNTARY EXTENDED
COLLECTIVE LICENSING: IMPACT ON UK MUSEUMS (2012), http://www
.nationalmuseums.org.uk/media/documents/images/nmdc_err_briefing_on_orph
an_works_and_vol_ecl.pdf; AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, COPYRIGHT AND THE
DIGITAL ECONOMY 290-91, http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/
publications/13.orphan_works.pdf.

48.

2006 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 46, at 37.

49.

The “Orphan Works” Problem and Proposed Legislation Before the H. Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. (2008) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).

50.

2006 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 46, at 26.

51.

ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 44, at 34-35.

52.

Marybeth Peters, The Importance of Orphan Works Legislation, U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE (Sept. 25, 2008) (recounting testimony before the House from the U.S.
Holocaust Museum).
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works cannot be used or preserved. 53 The orphan works problem is a direct result of notice failure created by a lack of claiming. 54 Illustrative examples of the
problems associated with unclaimed works are further explored in Part III.
Today, we have shifted from an opt-in system to a system that automatically vests protection upon fixation in a tangible medium of expression. 55 This
shift was spurred by a desire to harmonize domestic copyright law with international trading partners. But accepting the proposition that copyright protection
automatically attaches at the moment of fixation does not lead inexorably to the
conclusion that a copyright holder does not have some responsibility to claim
her work. The next Part traces the progressive relaxation of formalities in the
domestic copyright law.
II. History of Claiming
The history of the copyright is a history of public claiming. 56 The first federal copyright law, enacted in 1790, offered copyright protection to authors of
maps, charts, and books 57 who (1) registered a title of the work with the district
court, 58 (2) published a notice of the registration in the newspaper for four

53.

In a letter from the American Film Heritage Association to Senator Strom
Thurmond, Chairman Larry Urbanski stated “that as much as 75% of motion
pictures from the 1920s are no longer clearly owned by anyone, and film
preservationists as such cannot obtain the necessary permissions to preserve
them.” Orphan Works, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739, 3740 n.3 (Jan. 26, 2005).

54.

See Joel Sage, Revenue Streams and Safe Harbors: How Water Law Suggests a
Solution to Copyright’s Orphan Works Problem, 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 294, 298
(2010).

55.

Fagundes, supra note 42, at 155 (“The 1976 Act converted copyright from a system
in which authors had to opt in to possess rights in their work to one in which
rights vested automatically upon creation of those works regardless of the author’s
intent or conduct.”). See also Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of
the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123, 124 (2002)
(“[C]opyright law has flipped over from a system that protected only rights that
were claimed to one that vests all rights, whether claimed or not.”).

56.

See, e.g., Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771,
1804-05 (2006); Sorkin, supra note 34, at 591.

57.

Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 3, 1 Stat. 124, 125 (“[F]or the encouragement of
learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and
proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.”).

58.

Before publication, an author was required to record the title of the map, chart, or
book with the clerk’s office of the district court where the author resided. Id. § 1, 3,
1 Stat. 124-25. The Act further provided:
And the clerk of such court is hereby directed and required to record the
same forthwith, in a book to be kept by him for that purpose, in the
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weeks, 59 (3) and deposited a copy of the work with the Secretary of State. 60 A
copyright notice on the work itself was not yet required. Copyright protection
was limited to U.S. citizens and residents, 61 and these authors were given the exclusive right of “printing, reprinting, publishing and vending” the work. 62 The
initial term of protection lasted for fourteen years from the date of registering
the work with the clerk’s office of the district court where the author resides. If
the author survived the first term, the author could renew the copyright for a
second fourteen-year term by complying with the same formalities of registration and newspaper notice. 63
In 1802, the formality of including copyright notice on the work itself was
added. 64 In addition to publishing notice in the newspaper, an author was required to include a copyright notice on the title page of a book. 65 And in 1831,
words following, (giving a copy thereof to the said author or proprietor,
under the seal of the court, if he shall require the same.) “District of to
wit: Be it remembered, That on the day of in the year of the
independence of the United States of America, A. B. of the said district,
hath deposited in this office the title of a map, chart, book or books, (as
the case may be) the right whereof he claims as author or proprietor (as
the case may be) in the words following, to wit: [here insert the title] in
conformity to the act of the Congress of the United States, intituled [sic]
‘An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of
maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies,
during the times therein mentioned.’ C. D. clerk of the district of.”
Id. § 3.
59.

Within two months of registration, an author was required to publish a record of
the copyright registration in one or more U.S. newspapers for a period of four
weeks. Id.

60.

Within six months of publication, an author was required to deposit a copy of the
work with the Secretary of State. Id. § 4.

61.

Id. § 5 (“[N]othing in this Act shall be construed to extend to prohibit the
importation or vending, reprinting or publishing within the United States, of any
map, chart, book or books, written, printed, or published by any person not a
citizen of the United States, in foreign parts or places without the jurisdiction of
the United States.”).

62.

Id. § 1.

63.

Within the six months preceding the expiration of the initial fourteen-year term,
an author was required to re-register with the clerk’s office and re-publish the
registration in the newspapers for four weeks. Id.

64.

Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 1, 2 Stat. 171 (1802).

65.

Id. An author was required to insert “at full length in the title-page or in the page
immediately following the title” the following words: “Entered according act of
Congress, the __ day of 18__ (here insert the date when the same was deposited in
the office) by A. B. of the state of __ (here insert the author’s or proprietor’s name
and the state in which he resides.)” Id.
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Congress again amended the notice provision and extended the term of protection. The amendment simplified the notice affixed to works and eliminated the
requirement to also publish notice in the newspaper. 66 The initial term of protection was doubled, to twenty-eight years from publication. 67 An author was
eligible to renew the protection, which was still for an additional fourteen
years. 68 The total term of available protection was forty-two years from registration. Rather than requiring the author to outlive the initial term of protection,
the 1831 Act authorized an author’s widow and children to seek the renewal
term, provided the registration and notice formalities were satisfied again. 69
Failure to comply with these statutorily required formalities meant a work was
ineligible for the statutory copyright protection, and the work entered the public domain. 70
Three years later, copyright holders were allowed, but not required, to publicly claim their assignments. In 1834, copyright assignments could be registered,
but unregistered assignments were “void against any subsequent purchaser or
mortgagee for valuable consideration without notice.” 71 In 1874, the copyright
notice provision was simplified further and an author had the option to include
just the word “Copyright” followed by the year and the author’s name. 72
66.

Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 5, 4 Stat. 436, 437 (1831). The notice of copyright
required the following words: “Entered according to act of Congress, in the year
__, by A. B., in the clerk’s office of the district court of __ . . . .” Id.

67.

Id. § 1, 4 Stat. 436.

68.

Id. § 2, 4 Stat. 436-37.

69.

Id.

70.

See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 592-93 (1834) (“No one can deny, that
where the legislature are about to vest an exclusive right in an author or in an
inventor, they have the power to provide the conditions on which such right shall
be enjoyed; and that no one can avail himself of such right, who does not
substantially comply with the requisites of the law. . . . Every requisite under both
the acts of congress relative to copyrights, is essential to the title.”); Ewer v. Coxe, 8
F. Cas. 917, 919 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1824) (“[I]t is most obvious that the proprietor can
acquire no title to the copyright, unless [the Act] is complied with [inserting ‘at
full length in the title page, or in the page immediately following the title’ a copy of
the registration]. He must cause the copy to be inserted as directed, before he can
be entitled to the benefit of the act of 1790.”).

71.

Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 157, 4 Stat. 728. Across the pond, in 1842, English
policymakers abandoned copyright renewals in favor of a straight term of either
the life of the author plus seven years, or forty-two years from publication,
whichever was longer. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45 (1842) (Eng.).

72.

Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, § 1, 18 Stat. 78, 78. The alternative notice provision
was: “Entered according to act of Congress, in the year __, by A. B., in the office of
the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.” Id. 18 Stat. 78-79. The act also provided
that “no person shall maintain an action for the infringement of his copyright
unless he shall give notice thereof by inserting [notice] in the several copies of
every edition published . . . .”
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It was nearly one hundred years after the first federal copyright act before
protection was offered to foreign authors. 73 In 1891, copyright protection was
extended to foreign authors on three conditions. First, the foreign author’s
country protected works by U.S. authors on “substantially the same basis” as it
protected works of its own citizens. 74 Second, “the foreign author complied
with all formalities applicable to works of U.S. authors”, including registration,
notice, and deposit. 75 And third, the work of a foreign author was printed and
manufactured within the U.S. 76 This third requirement, known as the manufacturing clause, was one of the most unpopular provisions of U.S. copyright law
for foreign authors. 77 Indeed, scholars have noted that this provision was “one
of the most serious obstacles blocking United States participation in international copyright conventions, and on several occasions threatened to disrupt
entirely copyright relations between the United States and other nations.” 78
The manufacturing clause required foreign authors (1) to have their works
printed from type set “within the limits of the United States” and (2) to deposit
two copies of the domestic imprint with the Librarian of Congress on or before
the first publication anywhere. 79 Foreign authors were especially disadvantaged
by this requirement. 80 For foreign authors, it was virtually impossible to negoti73.

Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106, 1107. See also RICHARD ROGERS BOWKER,
COPYRIGHT: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW 358-65 (1912) (detailing debate and passage
of the Chace Bill); Paul J. Sherman, The Universal Copyright Convention: Its Effect
on United States Law, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1140-41 (1955) (“The International
Copyright Act, as it was known, extended copyright to citizens of a foreign
country that either offered protection to American citizens on substantially the,
same basis as its own nationals or was party to an international agreement
guaranteeing reciprocal protection to which the United States could adhere.”).

74.

Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 13, 26 Stat. 1106, 1110.

75.

1 PATRY, supra note 35, § 1:38.

76.

Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 3, 26 Stat. 1106, 1107.

77.

See infra notes 83-87, 190 and accompanying text.

78.

Sherman, supra note 73, at 1141; see also Hamish R. Sandison, The Berne Convention
and the Universal Copyright Convention: The American Experience, 11 COLUM.-VLA
J. L. & ARTS 89, 94 (1986) (“[W]hen the Berne Convention was revised at Berlin in
1908 to prohibit any formality as a condition of the ‘enjoyment’ and ‘exercise’ of
copyright, the Manufacturing Clause became a bar to Berne adherence by the
United States.”).

79.

Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 4956, 26 Stat. 1106, 1107; see also ELIZABETH K. DUNNE,
86TH CONG., STUDY NO. 20, DEPOSIT OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 15 (Comm. Print.
1960) (“The effect of the act of 1891, granting U.S. copyright to foreign authors,
subject to the requirements of the manufacturing clause, was to bring in deposits
of some foreign works for the first time.”).

80.

BOWKER, supra note 73, at 153-61 (summarizing the complexities of the 1891 and
1909 Act manufacturing clauses, and illustrating the difficulties for copyright
holders).
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ate for the publication of a U.S. edition before the work was published abroad,
especially if the author was writing in a foreign language. 81 While domestic law
nominally extended protection, the strictures of the manufacturing clause
“made the extension of copyright protection to foreigners illusory,” according
to then-Assistant Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer. 82
In 1909, Congress made substantial revisions to both the form and substance of federal copyright protection. Under the 1909 Act, copyright protection
was secured when a work was published with a proper copyright notice, rather
than when a work was registered. 83 Notice required three items: (1) either the
word “Copyright” or the abbreviation “Copr.”; (2) the copyright holder’s name;
and (3) the year of publication. 84 But if notice was accidentally omitted, that
omission would not divest copyright protection. However, an innocent infringer misled by the lack of notice would be insulated from damages. 85 The right to
cure an accidental omission of notice was included to soften the harsh consequences of failing to comply with the statutory formalities. 86 The innocent in81.

DUNNE, supra note 79, at 15.

82.

Barbara Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright-Past,
Present and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1057 (1968).

83.

Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (“[A]ny person entitled thereto
by this Act may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with the
notice of copyright required by this Act . . . .”).

84.

Id. § 18, 35 Stat. 1075, 1079 (providing that proper notice could “consist either of
the word ‘Copyright’ or the abbreviation ‘Copr.’, accompanied by the name of the
copyright proprietor, and if the work be printed literary, musical, or dramatic
work, the notice shall include also the year in which the copyright was secured by
publication”).

85.

Id. at § 20 (“[W]here the copyright proprietor has sought to comply with the
provisions of this Act with respect to notice, the omission by accident or mistake
of the prescribed notice from a particular copy or copies shall not invalidate the
copyright or prevent recovery for infringement against any person who, after
actual notice of the copyright, begins an undertaking to infringe it, but shall
prevent the recovery of damages against an innocent infringer who has been
misled by the omission of the notice; and in a suit for infringement no permanent
injunction shall be had unless the copyright proprietor shall reimburse to the
innocent infringer his reasonable outlay innocently incurred if the court, in its
discretion, shall so direct.”).

86.

A House Committee Report explained:
Under existing law notice of copyright must be printed in every copy of
every edition of a book. If any copy of any edition published by authority
of the proprietor of the copyright by accident or mistake gets out without
the copyright notice, the whole copyright is lost. More copyright have
been lost under this drastic provision of the law than in any other way.
Your committee believe [sic] that an unintentional failure to comply
with this requirement in the case of a single book ought not to have
attached to it the penalty involved in the forfeiture of the copyright . . . .
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fringer defense was, according to copyright scholars, “a very important development in the formality scheme,” because “it sought to accommodate those
who accidentally derogated from compliance (to a small, curable degree) but
also showed concern for the innocent infringer.” 87
In addition to modifying formalities, the 1909 Act also expanded the subject
matter of copyright protection to include lectures, dramatic compositions, musical compositions, works of art, and photographs. 88 The Act also codified the
first sale doctrine 89 and doubled the renewal term to twenty-eight years. 90 For
renewed works, the total term of protection was fifty-six years. While registration was not required for an initial term of copyright protection, it was required
for renewal. 91 An author could register any time during the initial twenty-eight
year term, and registration was not necessary unless the author wanted to sue or
to renew the term. 92
Leading up to the 1909 Act, the renewal provision was debated and some
urged a longer, unitary term rather than a renewal. 93 Other countries, like England, had already opted for a single, unitary term, rather than a split term. 94 But
in the 1909 Act the renewal principle was retained for two main reasons. 95 First,
the renewal provisions benefited authors by allowing them to capitalize on
works that succeeded beyond the initial twenty-eight year term. Authors often
assign their copyrights to publishers when the value of the work is unknown,
and they have little bargaining power. 96 The renewed copyright was seen as a
new and independent copyright, for which the author could bargain anew with
the publisher. 97 And second, the renewal provision helped filter out undeserv-

H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 13 (1909).
87.

Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1467.

88.

Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076-78.

89.

Id. § 41, 35 Stat. 1084 (“[B]ut nothing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid,
prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession
of which has been lawfully obtained.”).

90.

Id. § 23, 35 Stat. 1080.

91.

Id. §§10, 23-24, 35 Stat. 1078, 1080-81.

92.

See Shira Perlmutter, Freeing Copyright From Formalities, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 565, 566 n.6 (1995).

93.

BARBARA A. RINGER, RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT (1960), reprinted as 86TH CONG.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY NO. 31, at 105, 117-21 (Comm. Print. 1961).

94.

5 & 6 Vict. c. 45 (1842) (Eng.) (adopting a straight term of either life of the author
plus seven years, or forty two years from publication, whichever was longer).

95.

RINGER, supra note 93, at 121.

96.

Id. at 125.

97.

Id. at 124.
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ing works that lacked pecuniary and commercial value to the owners. 98 Moreover, the renewal registration, according to Barbara Ringer, offered “a helpful
starting point in searching copyright title.” 99
It took more than half a century for Congress to gather the consensus to
make another omnibus revision to copyright. Protection of U.S. works in foreign jurisdiction was a major impetus to amend U.S. laws to conform to international treaties, like the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Work. 100 Domestic copyright law was seen as a “copyright island,” that
was isolated from the international trading community. 101 Without reciprocal
protection in foreign jurisdictions, domestic copyright holders reported losing
billions of dollars from piracy abroad. 102 There was a growing desire to harmonize domestic law with international copyright laws in order to protect domestic economic interests. 103
The Copyright Act of 1976 brought about a watershed change in U.S. copyright law. 104 Domestic copyright law changed from an opt-in system that required compliance with statutory formalities, to a system that automatically
vested protection for original works of authorship at the moment of fixation. 105
Starting in 1978 (when the 1976 Act became effective), registration became optional and Congress began rolling back copyright formalities in earnest, as a

98.

Hearings on S. 6330 & H.R. 19853 Before the S. & H. Comms. on Patents, 59th Cong.,
1st Sess. 183, 183 (1906); see also H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222 (1909), S. REP. NO. 60-1108
(1909).

99.

RINGER, supra note 93, at 188.

100. Berne Convention, supra note 13. The U.S. International Trade Commission
estimated losses for lack of multinational copyright protection of $6.2 billion in
1986. Irwin Karp, A Future Without Formalities, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 521,
522 n.13 (1995).
101. David Nimmer, Nation, Duration, Violation, Harmonization: An International
Copyright Proposal for the United State, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 211 (1992).
102. See The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 2,
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706; see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 3 (2003)
(“[B]etween 1987 and 1999, a period of only twelve years, annual U.S. receipts from
foreign trade in intellectual property rose from $10 billion to $36.5 billion, versus
U.S. payments to foreign owners of intellectual property in 1999 of only $13
billion.”).
103. See, e.g., William Belanger, U.S. Compliance with the Berne Convention, 3 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 373, 373 (1995).
104. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 405 (2012)).
105. Id. § 408. At this time, copyright attached at the moment of fixation but the
copyright could detach if an author published without a copyright notice—and
failed to timely cure that omission. Id.
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prelude to joining the Berne Convention. 106 The notice requirement became
more forgiving, and an omission of notice could be cured within a five-year
window. 107 The manufacturing clause was phased out. 108 Rather than a split
copyright protection with an option to renew, there was a single, unitary
term. 109 And the term of protection was calculated from the author’s death, rather than from publication. 110 For natural persons, the term of protection was
fifty years after death. 111
By 1989, a copyright notice on the work was no longer required, 112 and by
1992, registration renewal was no longer required. 113 In 1994, Congress “restored” 114 copyright protection to certain categories of works if the author had
failed to comply with mandatory formalities. 115 In 1998, the term of protection
106. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 135 (1976) (“Without this change, the possibility of
future United States adherence to the Berne Copyright Union would evaporate
. . . .”).
107. Under the 1976 Act, copyright notices still needed to be put on published copies of
works, but the law allowed copyright holders to cure some inadvertent notice
omissions. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 405, 90 Stat. 2541, 2578
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 405).
108. 17 U.S.C. § 601 (2012).
109. With the unitary term, renewal registration became unnecessary for works created
after 1978. Copyright Act of 1976 § 302. And in 1992 Congress relieved authors of
works published between January 1, 1964 and December 31, 1977 from the
obligation to file for renewal certificates. Copyright Amendments Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-307, §§ 102(a), 304(a), 106 Stat. 264, 264.
110. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 304, 90 Stat. 2541, 2573-76 (1976)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2012)).
111.

Corporate and anonymous works were protected seventy-five years from the date
of publication or 100 years from the date of creation, whichever expired first.

112. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat.
2853.
113.

Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, § 102, 106 Stat. 264, 264
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2012)).

114. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 882 n.13 (2012) (“Restoration is a misnomer insofar
as it implies that all works protected under § 104A previously enjoyed protection.
Each work in the public domain because of lack of national eligibility or subjectmatter protection, and many that failed to comply with formalities, never enjoyed
U.S. copyright protection.”).
115.

Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat.
4809, 4976 (1994). Copyright protection for certain foreign works that had fallen
into the public domain for failure to comply with mandatory formalities was
restored “for the remainder of the term of copyright that the work would have
otherwise been granted in the United States if the work never entered the public
domain in the United States.” 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1)(B) (2012). See also Golan, 132
S. Ct. 873 (upholding § 514 and concluding that Congress did not exceed its
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was increased, retroactively and prospectively, from fifty to seventy years after
an author’s death. 116
The U.S. has progressively relaxed copyright formalities in order to comply
with the Berne Convention. 117 The Berne Convention is widely considered the
most important multilateral copyright treaty today. 118 One hundred sixty eight
nations have signed it, 119 and it has been incorporated into the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 120
The Berne Convention is predicated on principles of national treatment 121
and automatic protection. 122 The Berne Convention provides that authors have
the same rights to copyrighted material that the Berne Union members grant to
their own nationals. In other words, foreign authors are accorded the same
treatment as domestic authors. The second principle is automatic protection.
Automatic protection is embodied in Article 5(2) of Berne, which provides that
“[t]he enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any
formality; such enjoyment and such exercise are independent of the existence of
protection in the country of origin of the work.” 123 It is commonly understood
that “enjoyment” refers to the existence and scope of the copyright, whereas
“exercise” refers to enforcement. 124
authority under the Copyright Clause, and that heightened First Amendment
review was unnecessary).
116. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b),
(d), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827-28 (1998). See also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)
(affirming the constitutionality of the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act).
Protection for corporate and anonymous works was extended to ninety-five years
from the date of publication or 125 from the date of creation, whichever expired
first.
117. See Kenneth D. Crews, Harmonization and the Goals of Copyright: Property Rights
or Cultural Progress?, 6 GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J. 117, 119 (1998) (“The pressure for
international conformity has altered the means for acquiring copyright, has
restructured the term of copyright duration, and has brought new protection
under U.S. law where no legal rights previously existed.”).
118. Other major international treaties concerning copyright include the Rome
Convention, the TRIPS Agreement, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO
Performance and Phonograms Treaty.
119. For an updated list of Berne members, see Signatories to the Berne Convention,
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp
?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited June 5, 2016).
120. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
121. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 5(1).
122. Id. art. 5(2).
123. Id.
124. See Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1472.
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But the Berne Convention has not always been formality-free. The first incarnation of the Berne Convention, in 1886, required that authors comply with
the formalities of their home country to receive protection in other Bernesignatory countries. 125 But in 1908, the Berne Convention was amended because
assessing if an author had complied with her country of origin’s formalities was
too difficult, thus formality-free protection was adopted. 126 The resistance to
formalities has pragmatic foundations, rather than a deep antipathy toward
formalities per se. 127 By the time the United States seriously considered joining
the convention, though, it was unique in requiring authors to comply with
formalities. 128
While a majority of U.S. formalities have been rolled back to join the Berne
Convention, not all formalities have been eliminated. For example, a domestic
copyright holder must register a work as a prerequisite to filing an infringement
suit. 129 And for domestic and foreign copyright holders, statutory damages and
attorneys’ fees are not available for infringement that takes place before registration. 130 If a copyright notice appears on a hard copy of the work, the innocent
infringement defense is unavailable. 131 These provisions were intended to pro-

125. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 2(2); accord Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11,
at 1471.
126. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 4(2).
127. Stef van Gompel, Copyright Formalities and the Reasons for the Decline in
Nineteenth-Century Europe, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY
OF COPYRIGHT 157, 158 (Ronan Deazley et al. eds., 2010) (“Thus, the rationale
behind the [Berne Convention] proscription of formalities at the international
level seems to be practical rather than idealistic.”); Sprigman, supra note 33, at 545
(“[I]t is important to understand that Berne’s antiformality principle does not
arise from any supposed foundational incompatibility between formalities and an
authors’ rights copyright framework.”).
128. Karp, supra note 100, at 522 (“An additional basis for the U.S.’s gradual
progression toward a less stringent copyright environment was that the U.S. was
unique in its imposition of formalities and the resulting destruction of domestic
copyright protection for thousands of foreign authors.”); Perlmutter, supra note
92, at 567 (“By the early twentieth century, this extensive system of formalities had
become peculiar to U.S. law, placing us out of step with the rest of the world.”).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012).
130. Id. § 412. There are additional requirements to qualify for protection under the
Visual Artists Rights Act, including that for limited edition works of 200 copies or
fewer, they must be signed and consecutively numbered by the author. Id. § 101
(defining “work of visual art”).
131.

Today, a copyright notice on a copyrighted work serves as a bar to a minimum
damage award. Id. § 504(c)(2); see also id. § 402 (except as provided in § 504(c)(2),
when a copy or phonorecord bears a properly affixed notice, “no weight shall be
given to such a defendant’s interposition of a defense based on innocent
infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages”).
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vide powerful incentives for copyright holders to register voluntarily. 132 But as
discussed in Parts III and IV below, these incentives are not enough to prevent
deadweight losses and notice failure.
III. Claiming Today
We no longer require a copyright holder to claim an interest in her work.
Today, our formality-optional system has swept within the bounds of copyright
far more works for far longer than was initially contemplated. And copyright’s
bounds are larger than ever. Not only has the subject matter of copyright expanded, but the rights have expanded too. 133 Once limited to books, maps, and
charts, today’s copyright protects a full range of works including photographs,
sound recordings, and computer programs. And once limited to verbatim or
near-verbatim copying of a whole work, 134 today’s copyright allows authors to
prevent reproduction, distribution, public performance and display, as well as
the creation of derivatives. 135
The consequences for the expansive protection of original works of authorship are magnified with the Internet and the digital age. The digital environment has remade the relationship between listeners and speakers. 136 The line between author and reader, between creator and user, is blurred in the digital
ecosystem. 137 Modern technology has enabled nearly all of us to be publishers, 138

132. See, e.g., Oliar et al., supra note 1, at 2215-19; David R. Hansen et al., Solving the
Orphan Works Problem for the United States, 37 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 1, 48 (2013);
Perlmutter, supra note 92, at 569 (“The overall goal of the changes in the law was
to make registration an optional rather than a mandatory system, encouraged by
the carrot of ‘special remedies’ rather than impelled by the stick of loss of rights.”).
133. See Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587, 599-600 (2008)
(suggesting that copyright rights have expanded such that they now “spill out all
over personal uses like billowing white goo”).
134. See Samuelson et al., supra note 37, at 1191 (“In the early years of modern copyright
law, only exact or near-exact copying of the whole of a copyrighted work, which
would obviously undermine the primary market for authorized copies of the
author’s work, was deemed an infringement of copyright.”).
135. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
136. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Can Formalities Save the Public Domain? Reconsidering
Formalities for the 2010s, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1537, 1547 (2013) (“The digital
environment is also transforming the creative process, blurring the distinction
between authors and users, consumers and producers, exploiters and creators.
Works in digital format can be easily mixed and matched, cut and pasted, or
edited and remixed. The ease of changing and adapting enables users to
appropriate cultural icons to express new meanings and to aggregate existing
works into new content.”).
137. Id. at 1545.
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whereas in 1790 there were only a handful of publishers in the United States.
Today, copyright affects regular folks, not just specialized industries. 139 Copyrighted works are created with ease, and they are infringed with equal ease. 140
And we have coupled the expansive protection of modern copyright and the
digital age with the reduction in formalities. 141 This lack of formalities has made
ownership “muddier.” 142 The externalities of this opacity include a diminished
public storehouse of creative works from which others can draw.
Several societal harms flow from uncertain ownership. 143 Uncertain ownership retards the creation of new works, 144 like adaptations by documentary
filmmakers. 145 Uncertain ownership undermines digital dissemination of cultural and scientific works by museums and libraries. 146 Cultural works held hos138. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 31, at 169 (“[C]omputers have changed everything.
Digital architecture has so drastically reduced the cost of creating and distributing
expression that today we can all be authors and publishers . . . .”).
139. Samuelson et al., supra note 37, at 1177.
140. Gibson, supra note 31, at 214-15 (detailing a range of online activity that implicates
a copyright holder’s exclusive rights “from forwarding e-mail, backing up data,
and printing a hard copy of an online document to caching frequently accessed
files, cataloging Internet sites, and webcasting one’s travels,” and noting that our
world is “replete with copyrighted content that is constantly being infringed”).
141. WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT 204 (2012) (“In the past, a short term of
copyright coupled with formalities and the natural restraints that arose in the hard
copy world—significant costs in production and distribution—limited the
public’s innocent exposure to copyright infringement. With a functionally
perpetual copyright duration, no formalities, and instant global distribution,
matters have greatly changed.”).
142. Fagundes, supra note 42, at 155 (noting that eliminating formalities “made
copyright entitlements muddier, by robbing the public of a key means of
ascertaining the ownership status of a given work”).
143. See, e.g., Libby Greismann, Note, The Greatest Book You Will Never Read: Public
Access Rights and the Orphan Works Dilemma, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 193, 200
(2012) (“When the author cannot be found, subsequent creators are dissuaded
from creating new works that incorporate those existing works, resulting in a net
loss for the creative wealth of society.”).
144. See, e.g., Sami J. Valkonen & Lawrence J. White, An Economic Model for the
Incentive/Access Paradigm of Copyright Propertization: An Argument in Support of
the Orphan Works Act, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 359, 388-93 (2007).
145. Comments of the Int’l Documentary Ass’n et al. in the Matter of Orphan Works
and Mass Digitization (Feb. 4, 2013), http://copyright.gov/orphan/comments/noi
_10222012/International-Documentary-Association.pdf.
146. See, e.g., Comments of the Art Inst. of Chi. et al. in the Matter of Orphan Works
and Mass Digitization (Feb. 4, 2013), http://copyright.gov/orphan/comments/noi
_10222012/Museums.pdf; Response by the Cornell Univ. Library to the Notice of
Inquiry Concerning Orphan Works, Comment OW0569, at 1-2 (Mar. 23, 2005),
http://copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0569-Thomas.pdf.
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tage by unknown copyright owners have included unreleased jazz recordings
from the 1930s and 1940s, 147 photographs and artifacts housed at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, 148 and historical literature tracing the evolution of rural life and agricultural economy in the United States. 149 Large-scale digital archives offer unprecedented data mining opportunities for scholars, 150 yet
uncertain ownership of the works threatens public availability. 151
Uncertain ownership also impairs free speech interests in a robust public
domain. Uncertain ownership holds works hostage from the public. 152 Three
examples illustrate this problem. The first example comes from the Frontera
Collection at UCLA, which is reputed to be the “largest repository of Mexican
and Mexican-American vernacular recordings in existence.” 153 Notwithstanding
the “value of the collection to students, scholars, and the community” the
UCLA library director noted that “copyright law prevents the Library from
making this work fully available because most of it is covered under copyright
and we are unable to locate the copyright owners.” 154 The second example is
147. Steven Seidenberg, Orphaned Treasures: A Trove of Historic Jazz Recordings Has
Found a Home in Harlem, But You Can’t Hear Them, A.B.A. J., May 2011, at 48.
148. Balancing the Interests of Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property and the H. Committee on
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 64-67 (2008) (statement of Karen Coe, Assoc. Legal
Counsel, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum) (noting the Museum has
“approximately 42 million pages of archival documents, 77,000 photographs,
9,000 recorded oral histories, 985 hour of historical film footage, and its library
contains 72,000 items in 55 languages”—many of which are orphan works).
149. The Core Historical Literature of Agriculture: Background Of This Collection, ALBERT
R. MANN LIBRARY, CORNELL UNIV., http://chla.library.cornell.edu/c/chla/about
.html (last visited June 5, 2015). See also Response by the Cornell Univ. Library to
the Notice of Inquiry Concerning Orphan Works, Comment OW0569, at 1-2
(Mar. 23, 2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0569-Thomas
.pdf.
150. See, e.g., Content, Contest, and Capacity: A Collaborative Digitization Project on the
Long Civil Rights Movement in North Carolina, TRIANGLE RESEARCH LIBRARY
NETWORK, http://www2.trln.org/ccc/index.htm (last visited June 5, 2015) (a
collaborative large-scale manuscripts digitization project).
151.

Matthew L. Jockers et al., Digital Archives: Don’t Let Copyright Block Data Mining,
NATURE, Oct. 4, 2012, at 29-30.

152. See Loren, supra note 43, at 1434 (“I conclude that these works should not be
viewed as ‘orphans,’ but rather as ‘hostages’—constrained in their movement by
the restricting combination of copyright law and the absence of copyright owners
who could release works from their confinement.”).
153. Letter from Gary E. Strong, Univ. Library & Dir., UCLA, to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc.
Register for Pol’y & Int’l Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office 10 (Mar. 2005), http://www
.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0473-Strong.pdf.
154. Id.
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from a Cornell University librarian who recounted a similar orphan works experience for art work created by a Japanese-American while at the Poston War
Relocation Center during World War II: “The current copyright owner has
since disappeared and the paintings have become orphan—and no future
scholar can publish them again until they enter the public domain, some 120
years after the date of the events they depict.” 155 And the third example involves
the reissue of early sound recordings by African-Americans, which was planned
to accompany the release of the book, Lost Sounds: Blacks and the Birth of the
Recording Industry, 1890-1919. 156 But the release “had to be aborted because of
the time and cost involved in locating and dealing with rights holders,” according to the book’s author. 157 These are only three examples that illustrate the rich
diversity of cultural works that are held hostage by copyright and unknown
copyright holders.
The scope of the problem of unknown copyright holders is hard to overstate. 158 Orphan works can affect not only cultural institutions but also commercial creators and individuals. 159 Works of cultural value to scholars and archivists, like photographs, letters, and sound recordings, are likely to be
orphaned. 160 Works of historically marginalized communities, like racial and
religious minorities, women, the poor, and Native Americans, are also likely to
be unclaimed because of poor attribution and inadequate recordkeeping. 161
Modern digital works, like digital photographs and sound recording samples,
are also likely to become orphaned because digital technology allows works to
155. Response by the Cornell Univ. Library to the Notice of Inquiry Concerning
Orphan Works, Comment OW0569, at 3 (Mar. 23, 2005), http://copyright.gov/
orphan/comments/OW0569-Thomas.pdf.
156. Letter from Tim Brooks to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Pol’y & Int’l Affairs,
U.S. Copyright Office 2 (Mar. 23, 2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/
comments/OW0579-Brooks.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Tim Brooks to Jule L.
Sigall].
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Robert Kirk Walker, Negotiating the Unknown: A Compulsory Licensing
Solution to the Orphan Works Problem, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 983, 989 (2014); Mark
Tratos, Informal Formalities: The Government’s Attempt to Find Families for
Orphan Works, 3 INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 42 (2011); Sage, supra note 54, at 300.
159. See Vicenç Feliú, Orphans in Turmoil: How A Legislative Solution Can Help Put the
Orphan Works Dilemma to Rest, 12 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 110 (2015);
Hansen et al., supra note 132, at 14.
160. Katharina de la Durantaye, Finding A Home for Orphans: Google Book Search and
Orphan Works Law in the United States and Europe, 21 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 229, 234-35 (2011).
161. Brianna Dahlberg, Note, The Orphan Works Problem: Preserving Access to the
Cultural History of Disadvantaged Groups, 20 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 275, 288
(2011) (“[T]he orphan works problem disproportionately impacts access to
cultural works by minorities, women, and other disadvantaged groups.”).
447

Claiming the Copyright Post-Macro (Do Not Delete)

YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW

7/7/2016 3:29 PM

34 : 425

2016

be separated from ownership information. 162 This is a problem for new works,
as well as old works, and one that is not likely to go away any time soon.
The problem of unclaimed works was not an unanticipated consequence of
abandoning the notice formalities. Congress nevertheless pursued this policy
change. In an attempt to explain Congress’s largesse with regard to copyright,
some scholars have observed the mentality that “if a little copyright law is good,
more is always better.” 163 But a little now goes a long way—specifically seventy
years after the author’s death. And it is far from clear that more copyright law
leads to more creative works for the public to enjoy. 164
It is also not evident that all original works of authorship fixed in a tangible
medium of expression want, need, or warrant copyright protection. 165 When
copyright offers the same protection to voicemail messages and honey-do lists
as it does to novels and movies, perhaps it is worth reconsidering the default
presumption of full protection without any affirmative claiming by the author.
Works created with little regard for copyright are extended the same protection
as works that are deeply reliant on copyright as a vehicle for financial compensation. And it is uncertain whether an author can efficiently disclaim her copy-

162. See The “Orphan Works” Problem and Proposed Legislation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights), http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031308.html; Comment on
Orphan Works Study (70 FR 3739) from Brad Holland & Cynthia Turner,
Illustrators’ P’ship of Am., to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Policy & Int’l
Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office (Mar. 24 2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/
comments/OW0660-Holland-Turner.pdf; see also Comments on Notice of
Inquiry Regarding Orphan Works from Stephen Morris, Prof’l Photographers of
Am., to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Policy & Int’l Affairs, U.S. Copyright
Office (Mar. 25, 2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0642PPA.pdf.
163. Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical
Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669, 1681 (2009).
164. Id. at 1708 (“At the very least, our findings cast serious doubt on the idea that, with
copyright law, one size fits all. In other words, there is little support for the broad
proposition that one may expect changes in copyright law to have a predictable
and uniform effect across all creative works, whether those works are books, sound
recordings, or musical compositions. Even interpreted in the light most favorable
to our hypotheses, the evidence suggests that it is at best slightly better than a coin
toss whether a legal change will have any effect upon a single category of creative
works.”).
165. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 31, at 215 (“Because copyright protection attaches the
instant an original thought is expressed in fixed form, these newly empowered
authors never have a chance to affirmatively decide whether they want that
protection.”).
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right to the public domain. 166 Copyright attaches whether or not the author
wants, needs, or knows it—for seventy years after an author’s death.
It is not clear that copyright is the driver of creation for most texts, tweets,
and selfies, rather than just an afterthought. 167 Our digital ephemera likely have
little regard for copyright. The same can be said of many private letters, family
photographs, and personal diaries. While such works may have little commercial value, they can have high cultural and historic value.
Scholars have denominated works for which copyright was only an afterthought as the “dark matter” of copyright. 168 For these works, copyright is neither a consideration nor an incentive. Copyright-as-afterthought risks undermining respect for copyright. When the creator of dark matter does not care
about copyright, it is hard to get the public to respect copyright as a whole. 169
The breadth of copyright today leads to innumerable technical violations that
social norms would regard as innocuous. 170 Copyright’s indiscriminate ubiquity
defies common sense. 171
The consequences of too much indiscriminate copyright are considerable.
We face an ever growing private domain and a shrinking public domain. We

166. Lydia Pallas Loren, Building A Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works:
Enforcement of Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright,
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 271, 320 (2007) (“Whether a copyright owner can abandon
a portion of the rights granted to him remains an open question.”); see also
Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright Licenses
and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 362 (2010)
(noting uncertainty about “whether an author may use the statute’s termination
provisions to rescind her own express dedication of a work to the public
domain”).
167. Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 740 (2003)
(“[C]opyright law might want to distinguish authors whose expressive activities
are motivated by copyright from authors for whom copyright was an
afterthought.”).
168. See Stef van Gompel, Copyright Formalities in the Internet Age: Filters of Protection
or Facilitators of Licensing, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1425, 1432 (2013) (quoting Fred
von Lohmann, Senior Copyright Counsel at Google).
169. See Gibson, supra note 31, at 230-31.
170. John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap,
2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 543-48.
171. Pamela Samuelson, Is Copyright Reform Possible?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 740, 751 (2013)
(noting that restoring formalities “would breed more respect for copyright law
because the current law’s promiscuous ubiquity—under which even grocery lists,
emails, and mobile phone photos are automatically protected for seven decades
past their authors’ lives—runs counter to common sense and is economically
unnecessary and inefficient”).
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face a virtually perpetual copyright term, 172 even for works of unknown owners.
The problem of unknown and unfindable copyright holders threatens the creation of new works, scholarly access to digitized archives of disintegrating analog
works, and the fodder necessary for robust public discourse. Rather than serving as the engine of progress, copyright now is a burden on speech and creativity. 173
This is the right time for this conversation. Calls for copyright reform are
everywhere. 174 Domestic 175 and international 176 policymakers are grappling with
the notice failure externalities caused by a reduction in formalities. Solutions to
the orphan works problem are presently being debated in the United States 177
and the European Union. 178 Part IV outlines my proposal for “new-style” formalities as a solution to notice failure. 179

172. Sprigman, supra note 33, at 522 (“The copyright term is now sufficiently long that
the net present value to the rightsholder of a copyright is practically
indistinguishable from what it would be under a perpetual term.”).
173. See Valkonen & White, supra note 144, at 361-62 (“[T]he copyright regime should
protect creativity, not creators.”).
174. See, e.g., Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1470 (arguing “a renewed discussion
on formalities is both timely and necessary”); see also Note, Copyright Reform and
the Takings Clause, 128 HARV. L. REV. 973, 973 (2015) (“Over the last fifteen years,
there has been a marked uptick in scholarly and popular calls for the reform, or
even the replacement, of the copyright system.”); Samuelson, supra note 171, at 740
(“Copyright law has taken quite a beating in the legal literature in the past decade
or so.”).
175. Feliú, supra note 159, at 107 (“The orphan works issue has continued to grow in the
United States despite strong efforts to find a workable solution.”).
176. See, e.g., IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND GROWTH 38 (2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32563/ipreview-finalreport.pdf.
177. See Orphan Works, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/orphan
(last visited June 5, 2016); (providing overview of and resources concerning the
orphan works issue); ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 44.
178. Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October
2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works art. 1(1), 2012 O.J. (L 299) 8,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012L0028&rid
=1; Impact Assessment on the Cross-Border Online Access to Orphan Works
Accompanying Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works (Euro. Comm’n, Staff
Working Paper, May 24, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ia_carried
_out/docs/ia_2011/sec_2011_0615_en.pdf.
179. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, A Realist Approach to Copyright Law’s Formalities, 28
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1511, 1525 (2013) (discussing advantages of new-style
formalities).
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IV. A Modest Proposal: Claim the Copyright
I propose incentivizing a copyright holder to publicly claim her work. And
if she fails to do so, I propose a robust defense to users of unclaimed works. The
goal of my proposal is to increase productive and socially beneficial uses of unclaimed works by decreasing the risks of using these unclaimed works. There
are a host of advantages that flow from requiring a copyright holder to claim an
interest in her work. These advantages, explored below, include a workable solution to the orphan works problem, functional replenishment of the public
domain, and decreased transaction costs to license works. And as discussed below, this proposal complies with our international obligations under the Berne
Convention.
The pendulum has swung on the prevailing views of formalities. 180 Formalities may have been at their height under the 1909 Act, which included the manufacturing clause and renewal provisions. Leading up to the 1976 Act, the challenge against formalities was mounting. The main criticisms against formalities
centered on fairness. Formalities were seen as a trap for the unwary because
compliance was onerous and cumbersome. 181 Many copyrights were lost because of strict interpretation and technical defects in the notice and registration. 182 Formalities were also costly, 183 which tended to favor commercial creators. And elements like the manufacturing clause 184 were protectionist for U.S.
authors, which engendered strong antipathy from foreign authors toward U.S.
formalities. 185
180. See, e.g., Séverine Dusollier, (Re)Introducing Formalities in Copyright as a Strategy
for the Public Domain, in OPEN CONTENT LICENSING: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
75, 103-05 (Lucie Guibault & Christina Angelopoulos eds., 2011); STEF VAN GOMPEL,
FORMALITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAW 1-8 (2011); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW
BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND
CONTROL CREATIVITY 290-91 (2004).
181. See, e.g., Molly Schaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1535, 1541 n.26 (2005) (“[T]he formalities of U.S. copyright law had long
been criticized as hypertechnical traps for unsophisticated authors.”).
182. See Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1461 (“A number of formalities were
difficult to comply with, and many works were thus accidentally unregistered or
registered incorrectly.”); see also CATHERINE SEVILLE, THE INTERNATIONALISATION
OF COPYRIGHT LAW: BOOKS, BUCCANEERS AND THE BLACK FLAG IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 248 (2006).
183. See Sprigman, supra note 33, at 493.
184. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 4956, 26 Stat. 1106, 1107.
185. See, e.g., 1 PATRY, supra note 35, § 1:38 (“[T]he manufacturing clause, remained, in
amended form, a most unfortunate part of U.S. copyright law until July 1, 1986.
The conditioning of copyright protection on local printing was a reactionary
return to the monopolistic days of the Stationers Company, where the interests of
printers and booksellers were primary.”); Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1463
(“The perceived burden of complying with formalities and the strict application of
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The 1976 Act signaled a major policy shift as the United States sought to
conform its copyright laws to the Berne Convention. We shifted from a system
that required public claiming to a system that required no affirmative acts beyond fixing an original work of authorship in a tangible medium of expression.
This shift has created the orphan works problem and impoverished the public
domain. In response to these concerns, there has been a resurgence in the formality debate. Formalities are now said to be in the “zeitgeist.” 186 This is the
time to consider how to thoughtfully reconstruct copyright law for the modern
digital age.
Before exploring what appropriate formalities might look like, it is worth
noting that a number of criticisms have been raised at the prospect of reintroducing formalities. Some criticisms are of a philosophical nature, whereas others have a pragmatic basis.
Some who resist the reintroduction of formalities champion a natural
rights perspective on copyright. 187 From the Lockean view, a person is entitled
to the fruits of her labor. 188 And from a moral rights perspective, an author’s
personality that is reflected in a work of authorship is entitled to legal protection. 189 Formalities that force an author to make an affirmative claim on her
copyright, or risk losing protection, are thought to be in basic conflict with
these principles. But these perspectives are not irreconcilable with the notion of
limited rights. Even countries that embrace natural and moral rights philoso-

the U.S. manufacturing clause may also have been in the minds of the Berne
negotiators in Berlin, which resulted in the adoption of the broad ban on
formalities.”); Robert Spoo, Note, Copyright Protectionism and Its Discontents: The
Case of James Joyce’s Ulysses in America, 108 YALE L.J. 633, 645 (1998) (“Clearly, the
legislative purpose behind the manufacturing clause, in both its 1891 and its 1909
incarnations, was protection of American labor from the effects of foreign
importation. . . . Since works that could not comply with the manufacturing clause
enjoyed no copyright protection, the clause helped create the conditions necessary
for book piracy—a fact that led Ezra Pound to complain of ‘the thieving copyright
law.’”).
186. Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1496.
187. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287
(1988) (discussing natural rights philosophy of copyright); Arthur Levine, The End
of Formalities: No More Second-Class Copyright Owners, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 553, 553 (1995) (arguing that formalities “inhibit[] the ability of a copyright
owner to enjoy the full fruits of her work”).
188. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993).
189. See, e.g., Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the
Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1 (1988).
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phies seek to balance interests of creators and users, and these countries do not
offer perpetual protection. 190
Another criticism against the reintroduction of formalities is that they do
not scale when applied to a large volume of works. Specifically, formalities
could be prohibitively expensive for creators of large amounts of content. 191 For
example, it has been suggested that it would not be feasible for authors who
publish digital content online several times a day to comply with copyright
formalities. 192 But this practical concern is not insurmountable. Concerns about
monetary cost could be addressed with something akin to a flexible spending
account at the Copyright Office or a blanket fee. 193 And concerns about process
costs could be addressed with an annual registration option for high volume
creators. 194
Another concern surrounds the unknown value of works. Some inexperienced creators may not know which of their works are worth claiming. 195 Yet
this valuation problem exists in today’s copyright structure. Authors often do
not know the value of their copyrights when they transfer their works to publishers. 196 Congress was mindful of this and enacted the termination right to
protect authors from un-remunerative assignment deals. 197 But a copyright
holder’s ignorance about whether to claim her work is not worth the current
deadweight costs on the public. We do not protect ignorant property owners in
other situations. Much like someone selling estate items, sometimes property
owners do not know the full value of their property. On balance, if the creator
values it, she should claim it or otherwise bear the risk that someone else can
put it to use. 198
190. Sprigman, supra note 33, at 543 (“[E]ven in so-called ‘natural rights’ systems,
copyrights expire, works enter the public domain, and the law therefore must seek
some form of ‘utilitarian’ balance between private incentives and public access.”).
191. Brad A. Greenberg, Comment, More Than Just A Formality: Instant Authorship
and Copyright’s Opt-Out Future in the Digital Age, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1028, 1048
(2012).
192. Id.
193. Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate
Relationship, 33 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 311, 346 (2010).
194. Id.
195. See Greenberg, supra note 191, at 1048-49.
196. Lydia Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the
“Inalienable” Right to Terminate, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1329, 1346 (2010) (“[T]he policy
justification for the termination rights is the valuation problem inherent in
estimating the commercial worth of a work before it has been exploited and in
judging its commercial longevity.”).
197. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304 (2012).
198. Under my proposal discussed below, if the work does turn out to be valuable, the
copyright holder could collect a reasonable license fee. A copyright holder would
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Others worry that formalities will favor commercial copyright interests 199
and disadvantage smaller entities and individual authors. 200 Some fear that
formalities would again become a trap for the unwary. 201 The concern is that
formalities would hurt the least informed and the least affluent. 202 Registration
might be too burdensome for individual authors. 203 And authors of usergenerated content may not be well suited to calculate and evaluate the potential
commercial success of their works to decide whether to comply with formalities. 204 But the current formalities already disfavor non-commercial authors.
For example, statutory damages are not a meaningful incentive for the average

have the option to claim the work and try to collect additional rents against future
users.
199. Elkin-Koren, supra note 136, at 1543 (noting a commercial bias in reinstituting
formalities); Julia D. Mahoney, Lawrence Lessig’s Dystopian Vision, 90 VA. L. REV.
2305, 2329-30 (2004) (noting “corporate copyright holders are likely to have a
much easier time negotiating the system than the lone individual creator, and that
a turn to more formalities could bestow an advantage on none other than the ‘Big
Media’ interests”).
200. Elkin-Koren, supra note 136, at 1551-52 (arguing that formalities, if reintroduced,
could “strengthen existing commercial players and marginalize individual creators
and collaborative initiatives”); Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The
Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
375, 383 n.27 (2005) (observing that formalities “could actually discriminate against
individual creators who are unable to carry the burden of legal counseling and
registration”).
201. Charles Ossola, Registration and Remedies: Recovery of Attorney’s Fees and Statutory
Damages Under the Copyright Reform Act, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 557, 561
(1995) (“If anyone is of the opinion that there are no such registration errors, he
should sit through a deposition with a client when he is asked to justify his
position on work made for hire in light of Reid factors, joint work in light of
recent case law, or what constitutes preexisting material for the purpose of
derivative works.”).
202. See Ginsburg, supra note 193, at 314; see also Perlmutter, supra note 92, at 586 (“It is
not good policy for any legal regime to penalize the unwary, the less well-off, and
the less sophisticated. The reality is that many individual authors fall into one or
more of these categories when it comes to the technical requirements of copyright
law. They have little legal expertise, either personally or readily available. We
should not make the choice that conditions rights on such expertise.”).
203. See Ossola, supra note 201, at 560.
204. Elkin-Koren, supra note 136, at 1552 (“User-authors often operate outside a market
scheme, and the creative output is often a byproduct of activities done for fun, for
social or political purposes, or for the sake of experience, experimentation, or selfexpression. In such cases user-authors are unlikely to have any structured
procedure for evaluating the commercial potential of a work.”).
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author; they favor institutional actors. 205 Moreover, for authors who create
without a profit motive, most litigation-based incentives are irrelevant. 206 And
as noted above, the valuation uncertainty exists today and is not unique to copyrighted works. It is manifest with tangible property too.
I acknowledge there are distributive concerns, but I believe they are overestimated. Appropriate use of technology, combined with a simple registration
form, could prevent public claiming from being too burdensome for average
creators. As a point of comparison, in 2005 Congress authorized a preregistration formality for unpublished works that served to supplement, but not supplant, the optional registration formality. 207 Industry forces, including the Motion Picture Association of America, sought a way to enjoin prerelease
infringement, such as when a movie is leaked on the Internet before it is released in theatres. Preregistration of a work enables a copyright holder to bring
suit in federal court and receive statutory damages and attorney’s fees. Preliminary data from this preregistration formality suggest individual users are not
disproportionately and adversely impacted by this preregistration formality. 208
Researchers have observed that the majority of users of the preregistration system have been individuals, small entities, and other non-repeat players. 209 In
light of this recent experience with the preregistration formalities, I proffer that
the new-style formality I propose would not disadvantage individuals and noncommercial creators. 210
Another concern about reintroducing formalities is that, without the full
right to exclude, authors would lack an incentive to create. Without a limited
monopoly right, the nonexcludable, nonrivalrous nature of copyright means an
author would be unable to prevent others from copying and using the work.
Authors would lack the financial incentive to create works for which the return
is less than the cost of investment. But often other doctrines are available to
help protect against activity that might discourage creation, such as privacy,
205. Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 454 (2009) (“The prompt
registration requirement for statutory damages has not become a meaningful
inducement to registration for all authors who value copyright protection, but
rather a substantial boon to major copyright industry players-the commercial
exploiters of copyrighted works whose rights largely derive from the Act’s work for
hire rules or assignments from authors.”).
206. Sprigman, supra note 33, at 495.
207. Oliar & Matich, supra note 41, at 1077-79.
208. Id. at 1120.
209. Id.
210. While a registration formality in itself may not favor commercial over noncommercial entities, the amount of the registration fee could have a disparate
impact and needs to be calibrated carefully. Id. at 1125-26 (noting “the fee elasticity
of preregistration likely changes with the type of preregistrant” and that it is “small
entities and individual authors who are particularly sensitive to increases in fees”).
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misappropriation, and unfair competition. Indeed, copyright is often illequipped to protect privacy interests. 211 Whether it is a rap music star seeking to
enjoin a magazine from publishing racist lyrics he wrote in his youth, or the
Church of Scientology invoking copyright protection to protect its scripture
from public distribution, or a famously reclusive author preventing the publication of a biography containing excerpts of his writings, 212 copyright is an inappropriate vehicle. In such instances, copyright can lead to censorship rather
than the progress of science and learning.
There are still others who express concerns about the Berne Convention.
Article 5(2) prohibits formalities that affect the enjoyment or the exercise of
copyright. The rejection of constitutive formalities was driven by pragmatic
considerations. Berne’s no-formality movement developed at a time when formalities were cumbersome and indeed a trap for the unwary. 213 It was hard to
know if an author had complied with her home country’s formalities. 214 In addition to complying with her home country’s formalities, some Berne countries
required foreign authors to comply with the same formalities as domestic authors. 215 Berne’s no-formality rule stems from practical problems. 216 Today,
there seems to be a new practical concern: we do not want each country reinstituting its own peculiar formality system for which compliance would be necessary to get international protection. 217 If the United States reinstitutes formalities, such action may embolden and enable other countries to enact their own
formalities, and U.S. authors would be disadvantaged if they did not comply. 218
211. Gibson, supra note 31, at 218-19 (“Copyright law thus operates under the
assumption that the author wishes to disseminate his or her work to the public for
a fee, and that the only thing standing in the way is the threat of unauthorized
(i.e., uncompensated) copying. When the opposite is true—when the goal is
privacy, not profits—copyright often gets it wrong. Because copyright law assumes
that authors’ desire for control derives from their desire to market their works,
courts presume an irreparable injury whenever infringement takes place. This
makes it remarkably easy for a copyright owner to secure an injunction, a prior
restraint on speech that would be exceedingly difficult to get outside the copyright
context.”).
212. Id. at 217-18.
213. See Jane C. Ginsburg, “With Untired Spirits and Formal Constancy”: Berne
Compatibility of Formal Declaratory Measures to Enhance Copyright Title-Searching,
28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1589 (2013).
214. SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 202-03 (1987).
215. Id. at 201.
216. Sprigman, supra note 33, at 545.
217. Id. at 544.
218. See Perlmutter, supra note 92, at 585 (“If the United States continues to impose
formalities on the effective enforcement of rights, even if the formalities are
technically Berne-compatible, other countries may choose to do so as well. The
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A growing chorus, though, argues that the Berne Convention should not
stop us from having a conversation about formalities. 219 Scholars are calling for
thoughtful application of formalities, 220 industry actors seem open to reinstituting carefully calibrated formalities, 221 and international governments are searching for solutions to notice failure externalities. 222 And even those who are generally skeptical of a return to formalities do recognize the benefits of public
claiming. 223
Ultimately, this is a problem for Congress to fix. 224 It has tried and failed, 225
but it is time for Congress to try again. In 2005, Congress commissioned the
Copyright Office to conduct a study of the orphan works problem and to publish a report. 226 The report recommended that Congress enact legislation to limit the remedies for copyright infringement against a user if the user performed a
“reasonably diligent search” for the owner prior to using the work. 227
Congress introduced bills in line with the recommendation of the Copyright Office. In 2006 and 2008, Congress put forth similar bills that would have

consequence could be a bewildering welter of formalities, all of which must be
ascertained and complied with in order to obtain remedies in different countries
of exploitation.”).
219. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 179, at 1518; Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts
on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 551, 570 (2007).
220. PATRY, supra note 141, at 208 (“In order for copyright to function effectively, some
measure of formalities must be imposed.”).
221. Mike Masnick, Did The RIAA Really Just Come Out In Support Of ‘Opt-In’
Copyright? [Updated], TECHDIRT (Oct. 15, 2010, 1:53 PM), https://www.techdirt
.com/articles/20101015/13051411452/did-the-riaa-just-come-out-in-support-of-optin-copyright.shtml.
222. See NEW RENAISSANCE, REPORT OF THE ‘COMITÉ DES SAGES’ REFLECTION GROUP ON
BRINGING EUROPE’S CULTURAL HERITAGE ONLINE (2011).
223. Ginsburg, supra note 193, at 342 (“Notice, registration and recordation of transfers
thus are unquestionably beneficial and desirable; the problem, and the historical
difference between the United States and much of the rest of the world, lies in the
consequences of failure to affix notice, register, or record a transfer of
ownership.”).
224. ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 44, at 2 (“[W]ith so many
equities at stake, the complexity and breadth of the issues make them well suited
for legislative action.”); Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting “the establishment of a mechanism for exploiting
unclaimed books is a matter more suited for Congress than this Court”).
225. See Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008);
Orphan Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. (2008); Orphan Works Act of
2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2006).
226. Orphan Works, 70 Fed. Reg. 3,739, 3,741 (Jan. 26, 2005).
227. 2006 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 46, at 41.
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limited remedies against reasonably diligent searchers. 228 The 2008 Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act would have limited remedies where the infringer had
performed and documented a good faith, diligent search for the copyright holder before using the work. 229 The use of the work must have provided attribution
to the copyright holder, if known. 230 And the infringing user must also have included an appropriate symbol or notice in association with any public distribution, display, or performance of the work. 231 Neither Congress was successful in
enacting the proposed legislation. These proposals drew scholarly criticism because the term “reasonably diligent search” was left undefined and was open to
judicial interpretation. 232
The Copyright Office has been studying the orphan works problem for the
past decade. 233 The Copyright Office’s 2015 report again recommended limiting
user liability only for those who can document a good faith diligent search. 234
But diligent searching favors commercial over non-commercial users. 235 Paying
for a search plus reasonable compensation may be too costly for large-scale users of orphan works, like the mass digitizing projects. 236 It may also be too costly
for all but well-capitalized commercial creators. 237 A diligent search also favors

228. H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2006); Orphan Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong.
(2008); see also Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong.
(2008).
229. Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong., at § 2(a) (2008)
(amending 17 U.S.C. § 514(b)(1) & (2)); 154 CONG. REC. S9867-68 (daily ed. Sept.
26, 2008).
230. S. 2913 sec. 2, § 514(b)(1)(A)(ii).
231. Id. § 514(b)(1)(A)(iii).
232. See, e.g., Feliú, supra note 159, at 120; Laura N. Bradrick, Note, Copyright—Don’t
Forget About the Orphans: A Look at a (Better) Legislative Solution to the Orphan
Works Problem, 34 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 537, 539, 559, 565 (2012).
233. See Orphan Works, 70 Fed. Reg. 3,739, 3,741 (Jan. 26, 2005); ORPHAN WORKS AND
MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 44.
234. ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 44, at 56-57 (“A diligent
search requirement is necessary both to offset the limitations on infringement
remedies that would otherwise apply, and to facilitate wherever possible the
would-be user locating and working with the owner.”).
235. Walker, supra note 158, at 987.
236. Id. at 1000.
237. See, e.g., Comments of the Library Copyright Alliance In Response to the
Copyright Office’s Notice of Inquiry Concerning Orphan Works and Mass
Digitization 8 (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/noi
_10222012/Library-Copyright-Alliance.pdf (“[A]ny legislative approach that
involves licensing, such as extended collective licensing, is completely
unacceptable to the library community. It would be enormously costly to users,
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well-funded projects over non-profit activities. This in turn creates a barrier to
entry for individual and non-profit users and a de facto cartel for commercial
users. 238 Rather than placing the burden on the user, a copyright holder should
shoulder some responsibility to claim her work.
I therefore propose that a copyright holder should claim an interest in her
original work of authorship. Specifically, a copyright holder should register a
claim of interest for her work and affix a notice of the claim to the work. Today,
copyrights come into existence without any formalities, and my proposal would
not change this. My proposed public claiming would not be constitutive; copyright would still attach at the moment of fixation. And failure to comply would
not divest copyright. But if a copyright holder wanted to seek certain remedies
against a user, she would need to claim her work. If a copyright holder failed to
register and failed to publicly claim her work (where appropriate), 239 a user
could mount a successful innocent infringer defense.
An author would have the right to claim her copyright any time during the
term of protection. But if a copyright holder failed to claim her work, a user of
the work would be allowed to raise an “innocent infringer defense.” Essentially,
a copyright holder would need to opt-in and publicly claim her work to defeat
the innocent infringer defense. Perfecting registration and notice would foreclose future users’ resort to the innocent infringer defense. This is similar to the
current requirement that a work be registered to be eligible for statutory damages and attorneys’ fees. But these current statutory incentives alone are not sufficient to curb the orphan works problem discussed above. My proposal offers
added protection to users.
Users shy away from orphan works in part because of the liability they face.
Copyright liability arises even if the user reasonably, but erroneously, thought a
work was in the public domain. 240 Today, ignorance of the copyright status of a
work is irrelevant. For copyright liability, it does not matter if the work fails to
bear a copyright notice or is unregistered—but these factors can influence the
assessment of damages. 241 Reinvigorating an innocent infringer defense makes

and little if any of the fees collected would ever actually reach the copyright owners
of the orphan works.”).
238. Walker, supra note 158, at 1002.
239. It is hard to put a notice on some works, such as live music. See Gibson, supra note
31, at 226 (“[I]t would be difficult to ‘affix’ a notice to a live musical performance.
The same might be said for digitally streamed audio, although the more high-tech
the distribution method the more likely that some effective form of notice could
be coded into the software and hardware.”).
240. ALAN LATMAN & WILLIAM S. TAGER, 86TH CONG., LIABILITY OF INNOCENT
INFRINGERS OF COPYRIGHTS, STUDY NO. 25, at 135, 144 (Comm. Print 1958),
http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study25.pdf.
241. Infringers are liable either for actual damages and profits or, if the work was
registered at the time of infringement, statutory damages ranging from $750 to
$30,000 per act of infringement (and up to $150,000 per infringement if the
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sense precisely because strict liability no longer makes sense. Liability, when a
copyright holder has not claimed her work, is unreasonable.
Under my proposal, a copyright holder would be encouraged to publicly
claim her work. To do so she would minimally include her name, 242 the claim of
an exclusive right, 243 and the date of creation 244 in a place readily visible to give
reasonable notice of the claim of copyright. An author’s name on the work,
while not always perfect information, is a good starting point for finding the
current copyright holder. 245 If the author named on the work is no longer the
current copyright holder, a user could locate the current holder by consulting
the registry. 246 For this reason, the registry should be current and userfriendly. 247 The practical effect of omitting a copyright claim altogether, as the
Copyright Office acknowledges, is that “often a search for the owner of copyright in the work is dead in its tracks as soon as it has begun.” 248 My proposal
couples public claiming on the work, with public claiming in a registry.
copyright owner proves the infringement was willful), “as the court considers
just.” 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012).
242. Or pseudonym if there are privacy concerns.
243. This would include “Copyright,” the abbreviation “Copr.,” the letter “C” enclosed
in a circle, “All rights reserved,” “Derechos reservados,” or comparable language.
244. The date of creation gives a potential user a starting point for evaluating the term
of protection. The date of creation is relevant for calculating the term of
protection for corporate works and works for hire. It is also helpful in evaluating
the duration of copyright for an individual because it helps bracket the time
during which the author lived.
245. Ginsburg, supra note 193, at 344 (observing “the author’s name should normally
furnish the best starting point for ascertaining copyright ownership”).
246. Thus, even if the author is not the current copyright holder, she can often help
point a user in the right direction. Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA
L. REV. 1, 47 n.214 (2010) (“In a world of media conglomerates who purchase each
other’s divisions, spin off product lines, and liquidate in bankruptcy at a dizzying
rate, an author is now far easier to track down than her assorted assignees, their
successors, and their respective assignees. It also seems more likely that an author
will have kept track of what publisher bought her publisher than that a publisher
will know how to find all of the authors whose contracts it assumed when it
purchased the company that purchased the company that initially held the
authors’ contracts.”).
247. See Ginsburg, supra note 193, at 346. Technology can be harnessed to create a userfriendly registry and help copyright holders affix notice to their works, like with
metadata. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 136, at 1540; Hansen et al., supra note
132, at 51. While the registry could be operated by a private entity, private registry
fragmentation could be a problem. Fragmented private registries are an
inadequate solution to the search cost problem. Regardless of whether a public or
private entity operates the registry, its utility is undermined if it is not current and
easy to use.
248. 2006 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 46, at 23.
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There are a couple different options to encourage up-to-date registry information. 249 If the copyright holder transferred her interests, either through an
inter vivos assignment or testamentary devise, her successors would need to update the registry. Failure to do so would allow a user to assert the innocent infringer defense. A defect in the registration could be cured at any time. But
while the registration was defective, a user could assert the defense. 250 In addition, we could require that any assignment of a copyright be recorded to be valid against subsequent transferees. Or we could prohibit an assignee from bringing an action for infringement until the assignment is recorded and the
registration is updated. And lastly we could require updating the registry and
recording the assignment or else the copyright would revert to the grantor. 251
Regardless of the specific approach used, a formality requiring transfers of copyright to be timely recorded would comply with our obligations under the
Berne Convention, as discussed further below. 252
In addition to encouraging public claiming and the use of unclaimed
works, I propose adding an innocent infringer defense to the defenses a user can
raise. This defense would not replace the fair use defense. 253 Today, the fair use
defense offers some protection for users, but it is often unpredictable. 254 Courts
are far from consistent in their fair use outcomes.255 And the Copyright Office is

249. Like with domain name registries, the copyright registry should be easy to update.
See IDRP FAQs for Domain Name Registrants, INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED
NAMES & NUMBERS (ICANN), http://www.icann.org/en/resources/registrars/
consensus-policies/wdrp/faqs (requiring “domain name registrants to review the
contact information associated with their domain names and make corrections
when necessary”).
250. Accord Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1480 (agreeing with CPP proposal that
copyright holders should be obliged to update the registry with information of
assignments or death of the author, with failure to do so resulting in loss of
registration benefits).
251. Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 193, at 345-46 (“Congress could provide a more radical
solution to incentivize recordation: any exclusive rights that are transferred but
not recorded within a stated period will revert to their grantors.”).
252. See Ginsburg, supra note 213, at 1621 (“The principal measure this Article proposes,
conditioning validity of transfer of copyright on recordation of a note or
memorandum of the transfer, is Berne-compatible because, while Berne protects
the interests of successors in title, it does not regulate the means by which one
becomes a successor in title.”); Ginsburg, supra note 193, at 345 (suggesting “a
filing obligation that addresses who owns a copyright, rather than whether a
copyright exists or may be enforced is not a prohibited ‘formality’ in the sense of
that treaty”).
253. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (codifying four fair use factors).
254. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 180, at 187; Litman, supra note 133, at 596.
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unable to provide legal advice to individuals with specific questions about fair
use. 256 Risk-averse users are often reluctant to rely on the unpredictable affirmative defense of fair use. 257 As a result, copyright today chills more than just unreasonable uses of works. Copyright chills fair uses as well. 258
The innocent infringer defense would insulate an individual user of the
work without divesting or invalidating the copyright in the work. The term “innocent infringer” 259 applies to a user of a work who cannot reasonably determine the copyright status of the work or from whom to seek permission. For
works that are without a copyright claim or a current registration, the user
would be “innocent.” As with the fair use defense, a user would carry the burden of proof on the innocent infringer defense. The user would have the burden
to show either that the authorized copy of the work she used did not bear a
copyright claim, or that the copyright registry information was not current at
the time of use. 260 As noted above, the copyright holder would retain the au-

255. But transformative uses tend to fare better in the fair use analysis. Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 742 (2011) (“There
is certainly a strikingly high—though less than universal—correlation between
judicial findings regarding transformativeness and fair use outcomes.”).
256. See 37 C.F.R. § 201.2(a)(3) (2015) (“The Copyright Office, however, does not give
specific legal advice on the rights of persons, whether in connection with
particular uses of copyrighted works, cases of alleged foreign or domestic
copyright infringement, contracts between authors and publishers, or other
matters of a similar nature.”).
257. See, e.g., Steven D. Jamar, Crafting Copyright Law to Encourage and Protect UserGenerated Content in the Internet Social Networking Context, 19 WIDENER L.J. 843,
870 (2010) (noting the problem with relying on fair use is the “after-the-fact
determination of fair use, the uncertain application of it to many particular
situations, plus the costs of defense if sued even where the defense would be
upheld”).
258. See Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV.
1271, 1288-91 (2008) (presenting a model of the private costs and benefits faced by
would-be users of copyrighted materials and suggesting that would-be users are
often deterred from engaging in conduct that likely falls within the ambit of fair
use).
259. I acknowledge that the term “innocent” user does not connote a homogenous
category, and therefore have further defined the term above the line. See LATMAN &
TAGER, supra note 240, at 139.
260. If a work bears a copyright claim, and a search of the copyright registry reveals an
author who is no longer alive or no longer the current holder, a user of that work
should be empowered to assert an innocent infringer defense. I believe it is the
responsibility of the author’s heirs or assigns to update the copyright registry.
Failure to update the registry should authorize a user to assert an innocent
infringer defense.
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thority to prospectively claim the work, or to update the registry. 261 Once an
omission was cured and the work is publicly claimed, a copyright holder would
be able to enforce the copyright against future users, who could not invoke the
defense.
Under my proposal, the innocent infringer defense has three components.
First, a user would be insulated from statutory damages and attorneys’ fees.
Second, as a measure of damages, a court would be empowered to assess an
amount equivalent to a fair and reasonable license fee. And third, a court would
have discretion to issue an injunction on the condition that the copyright holder reimburses the innocent infringer’s reasonable outlay of expenses. Actual
damages would remain available for all copyrighted works.
This innocent infringer defense would ameliorate the chilling effect and
risks associated with using unclaimed works. The first element of my proposal
is that statutory damages and attorneys’ fees would not be available against an
innocent infringer. 262 A copyright holder should be entitled to recover provable
actual damages, 263 but an innocent infringer should not face statutory damages
or attorneys’ fees. The presumption of harm for statutory damages is inapposite
when faced with a user who is without notice of the copyright status and a copyright holder who has not publicly claimed her work. Additionally, the party
alleging damages should bear the burden of proof. Here, the author is the least
cost avoider and should bear the risk of loss. Requiring the least cost avoider to
bear the burden of proof of harm fosters creative use of works, whereas the current presumption of harm and availability of statutory damages chill creative
expression. 264
The second dimension of the defense would authorize a reasonable license
fee for use of the work. As a measure of damages, a court would be empowered
to assess an amount equivalent to a fair and reasonable license fee. If at the time
of the infringement, the work was unclaimed, a copyright holder’s remedy
could be limited to a fair and reasonable license fee, or no fee at all. The court
could set the license fee on a case-by-case basis. Alternatively, guidelines could

261. I acknowledge that in some instances curative efforts may be easier for the registry
than for notice on the work. See, e.g., Charles Garnier, Paris v. Andin Int’l, Inc., 36
F.3d 1214, 1226-27 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding copyright holder’s curative efforts
insufficient when it did not add notice to all copies).
262. These remedies are already unavailable if the copyright holder failed to register her
work before the infringement began.
263. Admittedly, actual damages are hard to prove. See, e.g., Kent Sinclair, Jr.,
Comment, Liability for Copyright Infringement—Handling Innocence in a StrictLiability Context, 58 CAL. L. REV. 940, 964, 974 (1970).
264. See, e.g., Ryan Andrews, Note, Contracting Out of the Orphan Works Problem: How
the Google Book Search Settlement Serves As A Private Solution to the Orphan Works
Problem and Why It Should Matter to Policy Makers, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 97,
98 (2009) (“The prospect of either high money damages or an injunction deters
would-be users of orphan works from making productive use of them.”).
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set out reasonable license fees for different categories of works, and perhaps different categories of users, by either the Copyright Office or by a private collective rights organization. Regardless of who determines the license fee for unclaimed works, it should be a modest amount. 265 Works that are economically
successful are unlikely to be unclaimed. 266 If the copyright holder wants more
than modest license fee, she is incented to claim and register the work.
The third facet of the defense provides for injunctive relief, for which an
innocent infringer could seek reimbursement from the copyright holder for her
reasonable outlay of expenses. 267 A copyright holder could seek injunctive relief
against an innocent infringer. But the court, in its discretion, could condition
the grant of injunctive relief on the copyright holder reimbursing the infringer’s
reasonable costs associated with the use. If the user incurred substantial expenditures in connection with the production or performance of the copyrighted work, the court could award the copyright holder only a reasonable license
fee, rather than injunctive relief. 268 This proposal balances concerns about copyright trolls and interests of authors whose works are appropriated by commercial entities.
Offering courts discretion to balance the concerns of authors and users is
nothing new. It was once thought that the discretion of the courts to assess
damages was sufficient to insulate innocent infringers. 269 It was thought that
affording courts flexibility in granting remedies, rather than crafting a single
legislative shield for an infinite variety of factual situations, would better solve
the problems raised by innocent infringement. Unfortunately, history shows
that this remedial discretion alone has been insufficient to forestall the problems of notice failure. My proposal offers more robust protection for users of
unclaimed works, without divesting and invalidating the copyright. A copyright
holder could claim her work at any time, and then a copyright holder’s full
panoply of rights and remedies would be available.
There are a number of advantages that flow from this proposal for newstyle formalities, 270 which does not condition copyright protection on registra265. Randal C. Picker, Private Digital Libraries and Orphan Works, 27 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1259, 1283 (2012) (“We should expect royalty rates for orphan use to be
modest.”).
266. Id. at 1261.
267. Cf. Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1474 (“Injunctive relief could be limited as a
matter of equity in cases where a rights holder has failed to communicate to the
public that her work is protected when circumstances do not adequately explain or
excuse the omission.”).
268. In such instances, the copyright holder would not be entitled to injunctive relief
and would be eligible only for a reasonable license fee.
269. LATMAN & TAGER, supra note 240, at 156.
270. See Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1479 (“[A] relaxed notice requirement
might conceivably be reconciled with Berne if it can be characterized as something
other than a formality.”); Sprigman, supra note 33, at 556 (“Although there are
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tion, reduces the consequences of infringement for unclaimed works, and yet
still allows for redress for the infringement of unclaimed works. In practical
terms, my proposal shifts the burden to copyright holders of unclaimed works.
Major publishers and distributors of original works of authorship already claim
their works. Open any bestselling book, watch the credits in any major motion
picture, and review the jacket on any popular music album, and you will see a
copyright notice claiming an interest in the work. Although operating in formality-optional systems, foreign and domestic purveyors of copyrighted materials often opt to publicly claim their works. 271 These copyright holders claim,
not because the law requires them to, but because it is in their economic interest. Copyright holders of commercially-valuable works recognize the benefits of
claiming. My proposal would have little effect on these entities. The major
thrust of my proposal is felt on orphan works.
Unlike prior legislative attempts at a solution to orphan works, I would not
put a double burden on the user. A user should not have to bear the cost of a
reasonably diligent search and the cost of a reasonable license fee. The Copyright Office recommended that Congress limit remedies as a way to manage the
orphan works problem.272 But this proposed limit on remedies would be only
for users who can document a “reasonably diligent search” 273—a vague term.
Searches can be hard and expensive, 274 and the prospect of a search can be
enough to dissuade use of the work. 275 Users who have engaged in such searches
report that they are onerous and cost prohibitive. 276
The burden of proving a reasonably diligent search is too high to put on a
user when the copyright holder did not publicly claim her work. Reasonably
diligent searching favors large, commercial entities over non-profit and indiarguments both ways, I believe that the better reading of Berne would permit newstyle formalities,” which are “voluntary formalities backed with default licenses.”).
271. Cf. Sorkin, supra note 34, at 592 (“[A]lthough European copyright laws are largely
formality-free, businesses involved with copyright use systems of registration and
recordation [] somewhat similar to those found in the United States.”).
272. See ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 44, at 1; 2006 REPORT ON
ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 46, at 115-21.
273. 2006 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 46, at 107.
274. Id. at 32 (“[C]onducting searches can prove to be costly, time-consuming
endeavors. The comments are littered with examples of situations where the trail
ran cold, turned into a dead end, or simply involved more time and money than
the user was willing to spend.”).
275. Id. (“The mere perception that a search will become long and arduous is itself
enough to thwart some potential uses” because, for example, “in academic,
scholarly, and other non-commercial uses, any search costs immediately outweigh
the expected monetary return of the use.”).
276. See Hansen et al., supra note 132, at 38 (“Library organizations have criticized the
onerous and expensive per-work search burden it places on cultural
institutions.”).
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vidual users. 277 Rather than putting the onus on the user, my proposal puts the
onus on the copyright holder to claim her work. The cost of searching for a
copyright holder can be prohibitive, especially when added to the cost of negotiating a fee once the holder is located. 278 Rather than layering these costs on top
of a subjective, case-by-case inquiry into the reasonableness and diligence of
each search, my proposal would protect users when the work is unclaimed. Requiring a reasonably diligent search does not meaningfully resolve the orphan
works problem. My proposal offers an objective standard for determining when
liability protection applies.
Using an objective criterion for an innocent infringer defense leads to more
predictability. My proposal would facilitate use of unclaimed works by reducing
the risk of using these works. And if orphan works can be used with limited
risk, then the problem of unknown owners is largely solved. 279 Today, ownership uncertainty plus the high risks and costs cause users to avoid unclaimed
works. 280 A reasonably diligent search standard does not ameliorate this. The
uncertainty of assessing ex ante whether one’s search is reasonably diligent risks
producing the same chilling avoidance of unclaimed work that we see in the
current system. Users will remain unsure if they are shielded from liability.
Under my proposal, the risk exposure for users of unclaimed works is low.
Statutory damages and attorneys’ fees would be unavailable, injunctive relief
could involve reimbursement of a user’s reasonable outlay, and a plaintiff likely
would be limited to a modest license fee, if any. And for these reasons, there is
greater incentive to privately negotiate rather than litigate a copyright infringement case for an unclaimed work.
Claiming also helps to filter valuable works from the dark matter of copyright. 281 Claiming is a rough proxy for financially-motivated authors. 282 My

277. See Walker, supra note 158, at 986-87.
278. See Letter from Tim Brooks to Jule L. Sigall, supra note 156, at 2 (“[I]t is no
exaggeration to say that there has been a chilling effect on the production of public
domain reissues because it is prohibitively difficult to establish what is or is not in
the public domain”).
279. See Sage, supra note 54, at 299 (“From a social wealth-maximization viewpoint, the
unavailability [of copyright holders] would not be problematic if the potential
licensees proceeded to use the orphaned works without permission.”); Valkonen &
White, supra note 144, at 399 (“[O]n the access-cost side, the elimination of the
barriers to use of orphan works can have a substantial output-enhancing
impact.”).
280. ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 44, at 2 (“While some users
certainly may have viable defenses on fair use or other grounds, many will choose
to forego use of the work entirely rather than risk the prospect of expensive
litigation.”).
281. See, e.g., Samuelson et al., supra note 37, at 1200-01 (“Registration, by contrast,
would signal to the world that copyright incentives are important to the owner of
rights in a particular work and would help potential reusers and follow-on
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proposal facilitates access to and use of works that the copyright holder did not
bother to claim. The failure to claim a work signals that the work is of small
enough value to the copyright holder that a reasonable license would be an appropriate compensation. For orphan works, a reasonable license would facilitate
the economic interests of the copyright holders, because otherwise the works
are not exploited. A reasonable license is better than nothing. And if the copyright holder disagrees, she is incented to claim her work. In other words, if the
copyright holder wanted more than a reasonable license fee, then she would be
encouraged to claim the work.
This proposal preserves a copyright holder’s ability to choose between
property rules and liability rules. 283 A copyright holder would decide whether to
publicly claim the work or not. Generally, applying a liability rule, rather than a
property rule, to unclaimed works would encourage more use of the works. 284
But rather than categorically shift from a property rule to a liability rule, like a
compulsory license scheme would do, under my proposal an author could opt
out of the liability rule by claiming her work. My proposal would give control to
the copyright holder. If the copyright holder finds a reasonable license acceptable, she can do nothing. But if she wants greater rents, she is empowered to
claim the work and get full property rule protections.
This proposal also complies with our international obligations under the
Berne Convention. 285 The Berne Convention prohibits formalities that precondition the existence or exercise of copyright. While the Berne Convention
creators to locate the person who owns the rights and possibly the conditions
under which licenses might be available.”).
282. Oliar et al., supra note 1, at 2241 (“What the copyright system does, however, is
mainly provide a market entitlement to creators that would allow them to exclude
non-payers from accessing their works, and thus enhances financially motivated
creators’ ability to appropriate the returns. Financially motivated creators are
expected to use the copyright system if the additional benefits that it secures to
them above and beyond all other background incentives outweighs their private
cost of using it. Registration records thus likely provide a proxy for the types of
creators who, and works that, benefit the most financially from the copyright
system.”).
283. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
284. See Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 785 (2007); Christopher Jon Sprigman, Berne’s
Vanishing Ban on Formalities, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1565, 1568 (2013).
285. See Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1479-80 (“By aiming only to reduce the
consequences of infringement for unregistered works, and not conditioning
copyright protection on registration, this proposal could be reconciled with Berne,
provided that the creators of unregistered works are not deprived of the
‘enjoyment and exercise’ of their rights. Provisions allowing some redress for the
infringement of unregistered works under qualifying circumstances may satisfy
this standard.”).
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prohibits copyright-specific formalities, it does not prohibit formalities like
rules of procedure or evidence. 286 Nor does it prohibit assessing fines for failing
to deposit a copy of a work with the Copyright Office. 287 The Berne Convention
also accepts that transfers of a copyright interest must be in writing. 288 Thus the
Berne Convention accepts some formalities. Here, my proposal to require a
copyright holder to claim her work, lest the work become orphaned, would not
run afoul of Berne’s prohibition on formalities. 289 Public claiming is not a precondition on the copyright.
Moreover, my proposal to retain the availability of actual damages and injunctive relief is important in the Berne analysis. 290 The alternative—to categorically eliminate actual damages or injunctive relief—would undermine the spirit, if not the letter of the no-formality rule. 291 But conditioning certain remedies,
like statutory damages and attorneys’ fees, on formalities, as we do now, com-

286. See SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 325-26 (2d ed.
2006).
287. Ginsburg, supra note 193, at 317 (“Berne does not prevent member States from
requiring authors to subsidize a member State’s national library by in effect taxing
the local publication of foreign authors’ works; thus, a member State may demand
deposit and may impose fines for failure to comply, so long as any sanctions do
not compromise the existence or enforceability of the copyright.”).
288. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012); Berne Convention, art. 2(6). See also Gervais & Renaud,
supra note 11, at 1472-73 (noting that the condition that a transfer be in writing is
“Berne-permissible”).
289. See Response by the Carnegie Mellon Univ. Libraries to the Notice of Inquiry
Concerning Orphan Works, Comment OW0537, at 2 (Mar. 22, 2005), http://www
.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0537-CarnegieMellon.pdf (“Like Stanford,
Carnegie Mellon University Libraries does not believe that requiring copyright
holders to file a notice with the Copyright Office to exclude a work from the
designation of orphan status conflicts with the Berne Convention’s prohibition
against formalities.”).
290. See Ginsburg, supra note 213, at 1593 (“Berne’s prohibition on formalities requires
that the basic copyright remedies, such as injunctive relief and actual damages,
remain available to foreign authors who have not locally registered their works or
undertaken other locally-imposed declaratory measures.”). See also Gervais &
Renaud, supra note 11, at 1474 (“While this [article 44.1 of the TRIPS Agreement]
requires an injunctive remedy to be available in all cases (in the sense that the
court must have the authority to impose it), it does not disallow the application of
equitable considerations in particular cases.”).
291. Ginsburg, supra note 213, at 1599-600 (“We have posited that member states may
not condition the basic remedy of injunctions (nor, for that matter, actual
damages) on compliance with formalities because such a limitation would
effectively eviscerate the no-formalities rule: a right cannot be ‘exercised’ if it
cannot be enforced.”).
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plies with the Berne Convention. 292 I thus argue that my proposal does not violate the Berne Convention.
I acknowledge that reasonable minds may differ on my proposal’s compliance with the Berne Convention. Scholars and policymakers have often differed
on matters of Berne-compliance. For example, copyright scholars disagree on
the permissibility of providing broader fair use protection for works that are not
registered. 293 And members of Congress, in the late 1980s disagreed about
whether the formality requirement that a work be registered as a precondition
to filing an infringement suit violated Berne. 294 On balance, the concern about
violating the Berne Convention should not be a sockdolager to the formality
discussion.
Conclusion
A copyright holder should claim her copyright. And if she does not, users
should have some comfort in knowing they can use the work. Claiming is part

292. Id. at 1597-98 (“In general, the argument holds that remedies that exceed the
protections mandated by international instruments are not subject to the Berne
minima no-formalities rule. So long as the member state requires its own authors
to comply with any declaratory obligations, then imposing the same obligations
on foreign authors remains consistent with the rule of national treatment. Berne
neither addresses nor, arguably, assumes availability of statutory damages and
attorney’s fees; TRIPS includes these measures among its specified remedies, but it
does not require member states to provide them. It might follow that conditioning
the availability (to local and foreign authors alike) of these remedies on some act
of public filing is both Berne- and TRIPS-compatible.”). But see id. at 1600 (“The
Berne-plus remedies argument thus rests on a fundamental fallacy. Article 5(2)
does not distinguish between traditional or basic remedies and additional,
unusual, or new remedies: all remedies come within ‘the means of redress.’ Under
this reading, there is no such thing as a Berne-plus remedy, and therefore no basis
to impose formalities on the availability of some remedies but not others.”).
293. Compare Samuelson et al., supra note 37, at 1200 (proposing that “[u]nregistered
works would still be protected by copyright law against exact or near-exact
copying that would cause commercial harm, but fair uses might well be broader as
to such works.”), with Ginsburg, supra note 213, at 1604 n.79 (concluding that the
CPP “proposal violates Berne article 5(2) because it makes the scope of copyright
dependent on registration: failure to comply with the registration formality means
that the work will be subject to greater incursions on exclusive rights than
registered works would be”).
294. Compare S. REP. No. 100-352, at 26 (1988) (“The committee concludes that the
recordation requirement of section 205(d), at least as applied to foreign works
originating in Berne countries, is incompatible with the Berne prohibition against
formalities as preconditions for the ‘enjoyment and exercise’ of copyright.”), with
H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 43-44 (1988) (“The [pre-suit recordation requirement] is
Berne compatible because the failure to record does not lead to loss of the
copyright—it merely regulates who may sue.”).
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of the copyright bargain. Public claiming signals ownership, filters out commercially-dead works, and facilitates licensing.
It is time to continue the conversation on how to thoughtfully reform copyright for the modern digital age. As the current Register of Copyrights noted,
“copyright law is over-stressed and requires some attention.” 295 Modern copyright’s stress is exacerbated because of the policy choices to make public claiming optional. Reform may face some practical hurdles, but that is no reason to
mute the conversation on what type of reform would be desirable.
Arguably Berne-compliant, my solution tips the balance and encourages
use of unclaimed works until the copyright holder elects to publicly claim and
register her work. Copyright holders would be forced to internalize the costs of
notice failure. Between a user and the copyright holder, the copyright holder is
the least cost avoider of the harms of inadequate claiming. 296 A copyright holder
can opt-in at any time and cure a prior omission of notice and registration. This
proposal shifts the externalities of notice failure to the copyright holder, rather
than to the public. Encouraging a copyright holder to claim her work improves
the information in the copyright registry, decreases the transaction costs of
finding copyright holders, promotes licensing of claimed works, reduces the
risks associated with using unclaimed works, and functionally replenishes public domain.
Rather than eliminating formalities, which has created notice failure and
unacceptable deadweight costs, perhaps a compromise could be reached. It is
unclear why it must be all or nothing. Why must the law require onerous claiming formalities or no claiming at all? Why must the law offer complete copyright protection or no protection at all? A compromise is appropriate here to
balance the competing interests and the instrumental goals of copyright. The
proposal outlined above balances these interests.
Admittedly, my proposal is not a panacea that cures all that ails copyright.
Claiming will not fix the clearance culture or prevent the doctrinal feedback
loop that unnecessary licensing creates. Claiming does not resolve, ex ante, if
non-literal copying is infringing. Claiming does not clarify the uncertainty in
evaluating the substantial similarity of works. This proposal, while not a perfect
solution, is a step in the right direction. 297 The story of U.S. copyright formalities is a story of adaptability and change. And we are ready for the next chapter
in the story.

295. Maria A. Pallante, The Curious Case of Copyright Formalities, 28 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1415, 1415 (2013); see also Samuelson et al., supra note 37, at 1177 (“Copyright
law is, for many reasons, under considerable stress today.”).
296. See LATMAN & TAGER, supra note 240, at 157 (observing that where notice is
omitted, “the copyright owners is better equipped than the infringer to prevent the
infringement”).
297. See PATRY, supra note 141, at 209 (“Reestablishing formalities is not a complete
solution to the changes in the world of producing creative works, but it would at
least significantly winnow down the number of problems.”).
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